Should We Make A Social Contract With Animals? by Saunders, M
  
 
    SHOULD WE MAKE A SOCIAL CONTRACT  
    WITH ANIMALS? 
 
 
 
 
 
A thesis submitted in fulfilment  
of the requirements for the  
Degree of Master of Arts in  
Philosophy 
 
 
 Mark Saunders  
 
 
University of Canterbury 
2010 
 
2 
 
Abstract 
 
 
 
This thesis considers whether we should make a social contract with animals as a means 
of informing us of the demands of morality when it comes to our treatment of animals. 
More precisely, it considers whether applying social contract theory to animal ethics 
results in a better moral argument for animal liberation than taking a minimalist approach 
to animal ethics.  
 
The thesis is divided into two parts. In the first part, Mark Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism 
is outlined and discussed as an application of social contract theory to animal ethics. It is 
shown that we can make a social contract with animals, and that there is nothing 
ridiculous about the idea. It is even shown that animals should (in principle) participate in 
negotiating a social contract (if we make one). Rowlands’ argument for vegetarianism is 
outlined as an example of how his Neo-Rawlsianism is applied. This argument relies to 
some extent on the claim that animals are harmed by a painless death, and an attempt is 
made to support this claim. But it is ultimately argued that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism 
falls foul of a reductio ad absurdum that puts it out of contention, thus implying that we 
should not make a social contract with animals.  
 
In the second part of the thesis, Tzachi Zamir’s approach to animal ethics is outlined and 
discussed as a minimalist approach. Zamir proposes a Speciesist-Liberationism. This is 
explained, and it is shown how it avoids the reductio ad absurdum Neo-Rawlsianism falls 
foul of. Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism is outlined as an example of how his 
Minimalism is applied. Various weaknesses are observed in Zamir’s argument, and a 
more minimal Minimalism is suggested as providing the best argument for vegetarianism 
and animal liberation, at least until a better substantive moral argument is found.   
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Introduction 
 
 
This thesis will consider whether we should make a social contract with animals. ‘We’ 
refers to all human beings who are moral agents, i.e. beings capable of self-regulating 
their actions according to the abstract principles of morality set out, for example, in a 
social contract. And ‘animals’ refers to the sentient nonhuman animals that we share our 
world with, and who are incapable of moral agency.
1
 As for what a ‘social contract’ is, 
for the purposes of this thesis, it is a hypothetical agreement among the members of the 
moral community as to how they will regulate their interaction, and which serves to 
inform us of the demands of morality.  
 
On the face of it, the idea of making a social contract with animals sounds ridiculous, 
since animals cannot enter into any such agreement in any literal sense or even self-
regulate their actions according to the principles set out in any such agreement. This 
thesis will demonstrate that there is nothing ridiculous about the idea of making a social 
contract with animals when the idea is properly understood. The more difficult question 
this thesis aims to answer though, is whether we should make a social contract with 
animals, or whether we should abandon social contract theory (and all such broad moral 
theories), and opt for a minimalist approach, in order to make the best moral argument for 
animal liberation.
2
 
 
                                                 
1
 Throughout this thesis, all references to ‘animals’ will refer to sentient nonhuman animals, unless it is 
stated explicitly that the term should be understood otherwise.   
2
 The notion of a ‘broad moral theory’ will be substantially defined below. At this stage, it may simply be 
stated that the approach of applying a broad moral theory to make a moral argument is to be contrasted with 
a minimalist approach to moral argument. The notion of a ‘minimalist approach’ will also be substantially 
defined below. Though the use of these terms in this thesis is original, they are employed to distinguish two 
different approaches to moral argument discussed by Zamir (2007). The essence of a broad moral theory is 
that it is grounded in broad abstract moral principles that can be readily agreed with, and the practical 
applications of these principles (i.e. the concrete moral claims derived from these principles) are to be 
accepted as morally binding because they are logically derived from the broad abstract principles. A 
minimalist approach may still make reference to moral principles in making concrete moral claims, but 
they will not be broad abstract moral principles, i.e. they will not be principles capable of providing the 
foundations for a universal morality that can be usefully thought of independently of how they are applied.   
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‘Animal liberation’ will be used as an umbrella term in this thesis to cover the many 
distinct views in the field of animal ethics that challenge the exclusion of animals from 
substantial moral consideration, and advocate reforming animal-related practices (e.g. 
eliminating factory farming) and transforming our own personal conduct in relation to 
animal-related practices (e.g. adopting a vegetarian diet). While this thesis will outline 
and discuss some moral arguments that have been made for animal liberation, it does not 
claim to substantially test the overarching moral argument for animal liberation. This 
thesis is primarily concerned with a question related to how the moral argument for 
animal liberation should be made. However, it should become apparent in the course of 
this thesis how persuasive the overarching moral argument for animal liberation is. 
 
Social contract theory (as a moral theory) is the theory that the demands of morality are 
fixed with reference to what would be agreed under a social contract. A social contract is 
a hypothetical agreement in the sense that it is constructed to set out ‘the principles that 
free and rational persons concerned to further their own interests would accept in an 
initial position of equality’.3 An ‘initial position of equality’ is not to be found in the real 
world and real persons are not reliably ‘free and rational persons concerned to further 
their own interests’,4 and so a social contract must be a hypothetical agreement. It can be 
thought of as a fictional, or heuristic, device that we can use to determine the demands of 
morality. The purpose of this thesis is to answer whether we should use this device to 
determine the demands of morality in respect of our treatment of animals. The great 
attraction of using a social contract device, in general, is that it promises to avoid the 
unsatisfying task of fixing the demands of morality with direct reference to our moral 
intuitions. Fixing the demands of morality thus typically provides little in the way of 
justification for the resulting principles that can be used to convincingly fend off 
conflicting intuitions and principles.  
 
The principles of morality set out in a social contract are the result of hypothetical 
negotiations aimed at arriving at an agreement on such principles. The principles are 
                                                 
3
 Rawls (1999), p. 10. 
4
 Ibid. 
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negotiated by persons reasoning in a manner that is self-interested, rational, and 
conspicuously amoral. The moral nature of the principles coming out of the negotiations 
is all down to the fairness of the procedure adopted for the negotiations. And fairness in 
this context is secured by withholding information from the negotiators about themselves, 
so that they are forced to negotiate impartially. Of course, we must refer to our moral 
intuitions in designing this procedure, but social contract theory has perhaps had the 
success it has because our intuitions about procedural fairness are more aligned than our 
intuitions about substantive morality.  
 
The fact that a social contract is a hypothetical agreement rules out any thought that 
making a social contract with animals would involve the ridiculous prospect of 
negotiating, and then signing, an actual contract with the multitude of animals we share 
our world with to regulate our interaction with them. The idea of there being a social 
contract between human beings that regulates our interaction with each other is not even 
thought to involve an actual contract. Until relatively recently, however, it does seem that 
it was assumed that the only parties that could participate in negotiating a social contract, 
and thereby have their interests furthered by the resulting principles,
5
 were those parties 
capable of negotiating and then signing an actual contract, i.e. moral agents.
6
 In other 
words, it was assumed that animals cannot participate in negotiating a social contract—
and so we cannot make a social contract with them—since they cannot negotiate and then 
sign an actual contract.  
 
Being capable of negotiating a social contract, and being among those that should be 
parties to the negotiations, are (in the context of social contract theory) pre-conditions for 
membership in the moral community. The negotiators of a social contract are instructed 
to further their own interests, so, obviously, those barred from participating in the 
negotiations will not have their interests directly furthered by the resulting principles. 
                                                 
5
 That is, furthered directly, rather than indirectly. It is not unusual for human interests to coincide with 
animal interests, and so sometimes directly furthering human interests will indirectly further animal 
interests. However, this will only occur sometimes. 
6
 This is something of an oversimplification, since incompetent humans and human children have 
effectively been allowed to participate in framing a social contract. These groups, however, have, rightly or 
wrongly, received something of a special pass that does not disturb the assumption outlined.  
10 
 
And so the assumption that animals cannot participate in negotiating a social contract has 
had a lot to do with the claim that animals lack moral status. Much has been written 
contesting this claim and in support of animal liberation, and the literature is now quite 
sizable.  
 
This thesis will not set out yet more new moral arguments or theories that conclude that 
animals have moral status. The field of animal ethics is, in fact, so saturated with theories 
that there has been a backlash in the field against so much theory. The only broad moral 
theory that this thesis will discuss is Mark Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism. The central 
thrust of Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is that we can and should make a social contract 
with animals. Chapters One and Two of this thesis will outline Rowlands’ argument for 
this claim, with Chapter One outlining Rowlands’ approach to moral argument and the 
principles he claims are fundamental to all contemporary moral theories, and Chapter 
Two showing how Rowlands uses these principles to argue for his Neo-Rawlsianism.  
 
Chapter Three of this thesis will outline Rowlands’ argument that an implication of 
making a social contract with animals is the moral requirement that almost all of us adopt 
vegetarianism. This implication is, of course, demanding and uncomfortable for most 
people, but the call for vegetarianism is not seen as grossly unreasonable among 
reasonable people (or, at least, among animal ethicists). Almost none of us need to eat 
meat, and there is no overwhelming flaw with the better arguments for vegetarianism 
animal ethicists have produced. However, reasonable people (including animal ethicists) 
will likely contend that a moral theory would be grossly unreasonable if it carried the 
implication that we cannot kill pest animals or that we must actively protect wild animals 
from the hardships of life in the wild. Chapter Four of this thesis will address what 
trouble is caused Neo-Rawlsianism by the fact that making a social contract with animals 
entails making a social contract with pest animals and wild animals.  
 
Though Rowlands argues that we should make a social contract with animals, he does not 
make a comprehensive case for this claim. His case for the narrower claim that animals 
should (in principle) participate in negotiating a social contract (if we make one) is 
11 
 
persuasive, but this does not entail that we should in fact make a social contract with 
animals—it does not entail that the social contract device should in fact determine how 
we treat animals.
7
 In particular, Rowlands does not give the mentioned issues concerning 
pest animals and wild animals adequate attention. He also fails to consider whether there 
is another, better way to argue for animal liberation than applying broad moral theory. 
 
Making a social contract with animals would present a real challenge to our moral 
reasoning and have real world implications that most of us would find intuitively 
unacceptable. Both these points impel us to consider whether, just because we can make 
a social contract with animals, and should (in principle) allow them to participate in 
negotiating a social contract (if we make one), we in fact should reform our treatment of 
animals by making a social contract with them. The question then becomes: do we need 
to make a social contract with animals—more generally, do we need to follow a broad 
moral theory in our relations with animals—in order to make a moral argument for 
animal liberation, or is there an alternative approach to making that argument, and would 
it be better to follow that alternative approach? 
 
Some might claim that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is not, properly-speaking, a social 
contract theory, and many would claim that it is not superior to other broad moral 
theories, but this thesis will not consider either claim. Rather, this thesis will simply 
assume that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is superior to other broad moral theories in 
order to treat it as a representative of the approach of applying a broad moral theory to 
make a moral argument for animal liberation. The approach of applying a broad moral 
theory, such as social contract theory or utilitarianism, to make a moral argument for 
animal liberation is sometimes called ‘moral extensionism’, which essentially involves 
extending a traditional human-centred moral theory to cover animals. There has recently 
                                                 
7
 Of course, insofar as Rowlands’ claim that animals should participate in negotiating a social contract is 
persuasive, we cannot legitimately refuse to make a social contract with animals without refusing to make a 
social contract altogether. However, this thesis cannot hope to assess social contract theory as a whole, and 
so it is limited in that sense. But if it merely turns out to be the case that the social contract device is a poor 
heuristic device for animal ethics in the sense that it fails to deliver clear and persuasive conclusions (and 
so we should not make a social contract with animals on that ground), then that would not necessarily have 
implications for social contract theory as a whole.  
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been a backlash against moral extensionism,
8
 however this has focused on the suitability 
of human-centred moral theory for determining how we should relate to animals (given 
that it is human-centred), while this thesis focuses on the backlash against deference to 
broad moral theories to make a moral argument for animal liberation when it is claimed 
that a minimalist approach can make a better moral argument for this.  
 
Among the broad moral theories that have been applied to make a moral argument for 
animal liberation, utilitarianism, natural rights, virtue ethics and the capabilities approach 
are all marked by difficulties that have been noted in the literature.
9
 But the only 
difficulty with applying social contract theory that has been noted is the difficulty with 
making a social contract with animals. With Rowlands resolving that difficulty,
10
 
applying social contract theory would seem rather less marked by difficulties than 
applying any other broad moral theory, thereby pushing social contract theory to the top 
of the pile. This thesis, however, in accepting that we can make a social contract with 
animals will provide an opportunity to plumb the implications of applying social contract 
theory for other difficulties that have not received attention to date. 
 
Broad moral theories, by their nature, are systematic, but our moral intuitions are not 
systematic, and so we often find broad moral theories challenging and radical. For 
example, we may be inclined to agree that we should treat others equally, unless there is 
some non-arbitrary reason for treating them unequally. But when this entirely reasonable 
principle is used to entail that we cannot be speciesist, i.e. discriminate on the grounds of 
species membership, we find our speciesist intuitions challenged in ways we may not be 
ready to overcome. Broad moral theories that are built up from broad abstract principles 
(such as the principle of maximising utility) have a reach in their implications that has 
                                                 
8
 See, e.g., Fellenz (2007). 
9
 Although virtue ethics has been included among the broad moral theories (and consequently sidelined in 
thesis), it is rather different from other broad moral theories, and has a certain amount in common with a 
minimalist approach. Ideally, virtue ethics would be given some attention in this thesis, but the space has 
instead been given over to other positions and issues. Certainly it is interesting to compare Part B of this 
thesis with Rosalind Hursthouse’s chapter on the virtue ethics defence of animals in her book, Ethics, 
Humans and Other Animals (2000). 
10
 Rowlands was not actually the first to resolve the difficulty, but this thesis takes no interest in the history 
of the ideas discussed. 
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little respect for intuitions that stand in their way. These intuitions (e.g. our speciesist 
intuitions) may be difficult to justify, but they may, nonetheless, have a hold on us that 
will not let go. Chapter Five of this thesis will outline the case put forward by Tzachi 
Zamir that animal liberation need not involve abandoning widely shared speciesist 
intuitions.  
 
Zamir’s project is the ‘theoretical minimization’ of the moral argument for animal 
liberation.
11
 An important part of his project is ridding liberationism of the need to 
establish moral status for animals. Zamir’s Minimalism is founded on the simple demand 
that it be specified what it is that animals lack that validates treating them in ways it 
would be objectionable to treat humans. Significantly, Zamir avoids nesting his claims on 
behalf of animals within a broad moral theory that would inevitably have wide and 
intuitively unacceptable implications. Zamir’s project will be used in this thesis to 
question whether we need to make a social contract with animals (and, more generally, 
whether we need to apply a broad moral theory), in order to make a compelling moral 
argument for animal liberation, or whether Zamir’s minimalist approach presents a viable 
and better alternative.  
 
The greatest strength of applying a broad moral theory to make the moral argument for 
animal liberation (e.g. making a social contract with animals) is the systematic reach of 
such a theory. A broad moral theory provides the tools to answer any question we may 
have about the morality of animal-related practices in a way that satisfies our desire for 
justification and consistency. The greatest weakness of applying a broad moral theory to 
make the moral argument for animal liberation is also the systematic reach of such a 
theory. We cannot, in good conscience, pick and choose when to listen to what a broad 
moral theory tells us about the demands of morality—even though it will sometimes have 
implications that conflict with our intuitions. Abandoning the approach of applying a 
broad moral theory would make animal liberation more intuitively acceptable, but it 
would also make it difficult to convincingly answer questions about the morality of 
animal-related practices. Thus determining whether we should make a social contract 
                                                 
11
 Zamir (2007), p. xi. 
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with animals requires a careful weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of the approach 
of applying a broad moral theory (specifically, social contract theory) against the 
strengths and weakness of a minimalist approach.  
 
Chapter Six of this thesis will outline how Zamir employs his minimalist approach to 
argue for vegetarianism. By comparing Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism with 
Rowlands’ argument for vegetarianism (as set out in Chapter Three), it is possible to see 
how Zamir’s minimalist approach differs from Rowlands’ broad moral theory approach 
when put into action. Ideally, several applications of Zamir’s approach would have been 
discussed to better assess the approach, and demonstrate its eclectic nature, but lack of 
space dictates that this thesis restricts itself to contrasting Rowlands’ and Zamir’s 
arguments for vegetarianism. 
 
By the end of Chapter Four, it will have been argued that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism 
succumbs to a reductio ad absurdum, which puts it out of contention, meaning that 
Zamir’s Minimalism need only be shown to be a viable alternative in order to be declared 
the better moral argument for animal liberation. Nonetheless, Chapter Seven of this thesis 
undertakes to weigh the strengths and weaknesses of Rowlands’ approach against those 
of Zamir’s approach, and answer finally the question of whether we should make a social 
contract with animals.  
 
With Neo-Rawlsianism getting knocked out in Chapter Four, the conclusion reached in 
Chapter Seven will have to be that we should not make a social contract with animals, but 
various weaknesses in Zamir’s Minimalism will also be noted. Not being a broad moral 
theory, Zamir’s Minimalism cannot offer a unified, systematic and substantive approach 
to a variety of moral issues. This jeopardizes the consistency and justification of its 
claims. But it also means that Zamir’s Minimalism is not committed to the wide and 
intolerable implications that undermine Neo-Rawlsianism. However, it is suggested that 
Zamir’s Minimalism is in need of recalibrating, and that the best moral argument for 
animal liberation would be a more minimal Minimalism that will be described in Chapter 
Seven. 
15 
 
PART A  
NEO-RAWLSIANISM 
 
 
Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism, the central thrust of which is that we can and should make 
a social contract with animals, appears to present a persuasive case for animal liberation. 
While his project of using a social contract device to make a case for animal liberation is 
not as original as he suggests,
12
 Rowlands should, nonetheless, be credited with 
developing the idea into a stand-alone moral theory. Part A of this thesis will outline 
Rowlands’ approach to moral argument; the principles he claims are fundamental to all 
contemporary moral theories; how he uses these principles to argue for his Neo-
Rawlsianism; and the central part his Neo-Rawlsianism plays in his argument for 
vegetarianism. An attempt will also be made to support Rowlands’ claim that a painless 
death harms an animal. And, finally, two hard cases for Neo-Rawlsianism will be 
discussed that arise out of the fact that making a social contract with animals entails 
making a social contract with pest animals and with wild animals. It will be argued that 
these hard cases prove too hard for Neo-Rawlsianism and undermine the whole theory. 
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Chapter 1  
Rowlands’ Principles 
 
 
1.1 ROWLANDS’ APPROACH TO MORAL ARGUMENT 
 
The ‘key to moral argument’, says Rowlands, is working out what we already accept.13 
You do not try to push general moral principles on others; instead, ‘you find out what 
general moral principles they already believe, and you work with those’.14 So, if you 
want someone to accept some claim, you first find out what they believe, and, if all goes 
well, you will then be able to show that if they believe what they say, they must also, 
logically, accept the claim you would have them accept. ‘Chances are’, Rowlands admits, 
‘it won’t go this smoothly’,15 but he suggests that perhaps you might still find a logical 
line of argument to the same result, even though it may be more complex. Once you have 
reached this juncture, your interlocutor must either accept what you would have them 
accept, or abandon the belief that you have shown to logically entail the claim you would 
have them accept. If they refuse both options, then they are being inconsistent. This 
approach will clearly work best if the belief your interlocutor proclaims, and that you 
have shown logically entails the claim you would have them accept, is a belief they 
‘really want to hold onto’.16 This approach works, says Rowlands, because we do not 
always ‘realize or appreciate the implications of what we believe’.17 Our beliefs are often 
complex, and we do not always appreciate their implications.  
 
Rowlands claims that his Neo-Rawlsianism does not involve pushing any unwanted 
moral rules or principles on anyone. Rather, he claims to work with principles we already 
accept. These broad moral principles, he says, are ‘etched deeply’ into our moral milieu, 
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and thus into the ‘moral consciousness of each one of us’.18 But we fail, he claims, to 
properly understand the logical implications of these principles. These principles 
logically entail, Rowlands argues, that ‘our moral duties to animals are far more 
substantial than we commonly think’. 19  That is, he says, the ‘fundamental moral 
principles’ that shape our moral milieu are ‘incompatible with our present attitudes 
towards and treatment of animals’, and so consistency requires that we change our 
present attitudes towards and treatment of animals in line with the demands of animal 
liberation.
20
 
 
The fundamental moral principles that Rowlands believes entail that our moral duties to 
animals are far more substantial than we commonly think are the Principle of Equal 
Consideration and the Principle of Desert.  
 
1.2 THE PRINCIPLE OF EQUAL CONSIDERATION 
 
Rowlands states the Principle of Equal Consideration as: ‘all people are created equal’.21 
He notes that this is not—obviously—meant to mean that everyone is born with the same 
natural talents, abilities, intelligence, or socio-economic circumstances. All people are not 
created equal in those senses. The claim that all people are created equal is not the claim 
that all people are physically or intellectually equal. Rather, the claim is that all people 
are morally equal.
22
 Moral equality is the idea that all people deserve equal consideration. 
Thus, Rowlands restates the Principle of Equal Consideration as: ‘every person is entitled 
to be treated with consideration equal to that accorded anyone else’.23  
 
In this chapter, equal consideration will be talked about only in the abstract, but it will be 
seen in subsequent chapters that what it means in practice (within social contract theory) 
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is an equal place among the negotiators of a social contract. The level of consideration 
one receives within social contract theory is determined straightforwardly by the equality 
of one’s place among the negotiators of a social contract. Making a social contract with 
animals entails giving animals an equal place among the negotiators. The implications of 
giving animals an equal place among the negotiators—an equal seat at the bargaining 
table—will not be discussed until Chapters Three and Four. Chapters One and Two focus 
simply on how Rowlands gets animals an equal seat at the bargaining table where they 
negotiate for their interests.  
 
According to Rowlands, the Principle of Equal Consideration can be understood as 
comprising two sub-principles, each of which is partly constitutive of its content.
24
 The 
first specifies an abstract principle of morality: as a matter of strict morality, each person 
is to be given their due, i.e. their due consideration, whatever that may be, and however 
that may be measured. This first sub-principle is axiomatic in any plausible moral theory. 
The second sub-principle functions essentially to place an important restriction on the 
first sub-principle: all persons are due, as a matter of strict morality, equal consideration, 
irrespective of their level of excellence.
25
 According to the second sub-principle, level of 
excellence (however excellence is defined) is not a morally relevant difference that can 
justify treating any person with more, or less, respect than any other person.  And 
Rowlands suggests that within contemporary conceptions of morality, shaped as they are 
by the democratic ideal, it is ‘difficult to imagine finding any satisfactory justification for 
claiming that level of excellence, however defined, can constitute a morally relevant 
difference between one person and another’.26 
 
Rowlands also notes that the Principle of Equal Consideration does not, 
straightforwardly, entail equal (in the sense of identical) treatment—it is not only 
compatible with differential treatment of persons, it may, in certain cases, require 
differential treatment.
27
 The Principle of Equal Consideration, it might be said, requires 
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not equal treatment, but, rather, equitable treatment, of all persons. All persons should, as 
a matter of strict morality, ‘receive their due’, as Rowlands puts it.28 And it is not always, 
and perhaps not even typically, true, he says, that what they are due is identical treatment.  
 
Rowlands suggests that the idea of equal consideration, is intimately connected with the 
equal consideration of interests. More precisely, he suggests that it is bound up with the 
equal consideration of ‘relevantly similar interests’.29 Peter Singer illustrates the notion of 
a relevantly similar interest with the following example:
30
  
 
If I give a horse a slap across its rump with my hand, it presumably feels little pain, 
whereas if I slap a baby in the same way, it will presumably feel significantly more pain. 
However, there must be some kind of blow, perhaps a blow with a heavy stick, that 
would cause the horse as much pain as the baby feels when slapped by my hand. The 
horse, then, has a relevantly similar interest in avoiding being hit with the stick as the 
baby has in avoiding being hit with my hand.  
 
Both human beings and animals, Singer argues, have a relevantly similar interest in 
avoiding similar amounts of pain. This is not to say that humans share all relevantly 
similar interests with animals; humans have interests that animals lack, and vice versa. 
Rowlands claims that all animal ethicists regard the interest in staying alive as a 
relevantly different interest for human beings and animals, i.e. all animal ethicists think 
that a normal human loses more in dying than does an animal.
31
 In other words, a normal 
human’s interest in life is not relevantly similar to that of an animal. This being the case, 
treating humans and animals with equal consideration is entirely compatible with 
according greater significance to the life of a normal human than to the life of an 
animal.
32
 
 
Rowlands contends that there is ‘fairly unanimous agreement’ that the Principle of Equal 
Consideration is a valid moral principle.
33
 The reason for this, he says, derives from the 
connection between the Principle of Equal Consideration and an even more basic 
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principle, which is constitutive of our moral thinking—it is ‘so central to the way we 
think about morality that it would be difficult, or impossible, to imagine what morality 
would be like without this principle’.34 Rowlands states this more basic principle thus: no 
moral difference without some relevant other difference. A ‘difference in moral 
evaluation’, Rowlands explains, ‘only makes sense if it is based on a [relevant] difference 
in other qualities’. 35  If two people do exactly the same thing, in exactly the same 
circumstances, for exactly the same reasons, with exactly the same results, it would make 
little sense to say that one action is good and the other bad. If the one action is good, then 
the other one must be good also.  
 
The implication of this, Rowlands observes, is that if we are to justify a difference in the 
consideration we accord two people, then we have to be able to identify a morally 
relevant difference between them.
36
 As Rowlands notes, Aristotle and Nietzsche believed 
that level of excellence is a morally relevant difference, and it was once commonplace for 
race and gender to be regarded as morally relevant differences, but, since contemporary 
moral thinking is shaped by the democratic ideal, we no longer hold these views.
37
 Today 
we believe that people do not come into this world with morally relevant differences 
inherent to them. This belief together with the claim that there can be no moral difference 
without some other relevant difference, leads to the Principle of Equal Consideration. 
There is no morally relevant difference between people as they are created that will 
justify a difference in moral evaluation, and so all people deserve equal consideration. 
 
1.2.1 Applying the Principle of Equal Consideration to Animals 
 
Rowlands launches his case for animal liberation with the Principle of Equal 
Consideration stated thus: 
 
 Premise 1: human beings are entitled to be treated with equal consideration.38 
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He then adds the idea that there can be no moral difference without some relevant other 
difference, which he gives this specific form: 
 
Premise 2: there can be no difference in the entitlements of members of two groups 
unless there is a relevant difference between members of those two groups.39 
 
That is, he says, ‘if members of one group are entitled to be treated with consideration, 
and if there are no morally relevant differences between them and members of another 
group, then members of that other group are entitled to be treated with the same 
consideration’.40  
 
Then, Rowlands says, we add the controversial premise: 
 
Premise 3: there are no morally relevant differences between humans and animals.41 
 
No one can contest, he says, the first and second premises, since the first—the Principle 
of Equal Consideration—is a ‘deeply rooted component of our communal moral 
thinking’, 42  and the second provides the logical basis of the Principle of Equal 
Consideration. Therefore, if we also accept the third premise, we get the conclusion: 
 
Conclusion: animals are entitled to be treated with consideration equal to that 
accorded to humans.43 
 
The problem is that many people think that premise 3 is wrong. Rowlands, however, sets 
out to show that premise 3 is true. While there are many differences between humans and 
animals, these differences are not, he claims, relevant ones—not ones that are relevant to 
the level of consideration animals deserve.
44
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1.2.2 The Differences between Humans and Animals 
 
Rowlands proceeds to run through the principal differences between humans and animals, 
arguing that these differences are not morally relevant ones.
45
 The most obvious 
difference between humans and animals is that they belong to different species. 
Rowlands easily dismisses any suggestion that this difference is a morally relevant one in 
itself, observing that you might one day find out that, in spite of being phenotypically 
identical to a human, you are in fact a genetic anomaly, and so not human at all. 
Rowlands asks: Would you, upon learning this fact, accept that you do not, in fact, have 
any moral status? The answer he invites is of course ‘no’. It is not the most convincing 
way of making the argument. A better way would be with reference to the Principle of 
Desert, which will be discussed later in this chapter.  
 
Rowlands also considers whether the fact that humans and animals look different is a 
morally relevant difference in itself. He dismisses this suggestion by observing that 
deformed humans, such as the elephant man, are not thought to be due less than equal 
consideration merely because they look different from typical humans. Of course this is 
easily acceptable; our intuition is that the differences between humans and animals that 
are morally relevant differences are mental, rather than physical. Thus Rowlands next 
considers whether level of intelligence is a morally relevant difference between humans 
and animals.
46
 The main argument Rowlands deploys against this suggestion is the 
Argument from Marginal Cases.  
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1.2.3 The Argument from Marginal Cases 
 
Although humans generally possess a higher intelligence than animals, there are some 
humans who are ostensibly less intelligent than many animals, e.g. brain-damaged, brain-
diseased, intellectually handicapped, and very young humans (sometimes referred to 
collectively as ‘marginal humans’). If someone claims that animals lack various moral 
entitlements because of their inferior intelligence, then they are also (in the absence of 
further argument) claiming that marginal humans lack those moral entitlements. ‘If this is 
so’, Rowlands asks, ‘why not treat [marginal humans] the same way we now treat 
animals? ‘Why not hunt them, wear them, experiment on them, even use them for 
food?’47 If level of intelligence is a morally relevant difference, and if it is morally 
legitimate to hunt, skin, experiment on and eat animals because they are less intelligent 
than normal humans, then it should be equally morally legitimate to hunt, skin, 
experiment on and eat marginal humans. Of course, we find the idea of doing those 
things to any human, marginal or otherwise, highly repugnant. The Argument from 
Marginal Cases points out that, as a matter of consistency, if intelligence is what matters 
morally, then we should find doing those things to animals equally repugnant, since there 
is no difference in intelligence between some animals and some marginal humans. 
 
The Argument from Marginal Cases can most probably be deployed against any 
suggested difference between humans and animals (other than species membership) to 
show that the difference should not be considered a morally relevant one, since most 
probably there is no property that all humans have and no animals have (other than the 
property of being human).
48
 Language, for example, has been proposed as a morally 
relevant difference between humans and animals, but certain human beings are unable to 
use language, and we would not want to treat those humans as we do animals. Rowlands 
claims that no one has ever even come close to identifying a property that all humans 
have and no animals have (other than the property of being human) that could be a 
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morally relevant difference capable of avoiding the Argument from Marginal Cases.
49
 
The reason for this is, he suggests, that there is no such difference. And, if this is correct, 
he says, there is no justification for the differential treatment we accord humans and 
animals.  
 
Rowlands does acknowledge that one can, consistently with the argument from marginal 
cases, avoid this conclusion by making the following move: 
 
It seems the only option available to someone who wants to insist that there is some 
morally relevant difference between humans and animals is to bite the bullet, move to 
Psychoville, and claim that certain human beings—the brain damaged, infants, the senile 
etc—who do not live up to the required level of intelligence (language use, or whatever is 
your favourite example of a supposedly relevant difference), do not, in fact possess moral 
rights, and do not deserve to be treated with equal consideration.
50
 
 
Rowlands notes the obvious objection to this move that it entails that marginal humans 
may be legitimately treated literally like animals, and this result will be unacceptable, as 
Rowlands put it, to ‘most people of a non-sociopathic persuasion’.51 Of course, those that 
make this move, such as Peter Carruthers in his book, The Animals Issue (1992), do not 
believe that marginal humans may be legitimately treated like animals.  
 
Carruthers claims that animals may be treated like animals, while marginal humans may 
not, for two reasons.
52
 Carruthers in fact claims that these two reasons are what give 
marginal humans moral status. The first reason Carruthers gives for why marginal 
humans may not be treated like animals, is that there is a slippery slope between the 
mentally defective and not-so-intelligent that would make any intent to attribute moral 
status only to rational agents ‘inherently dangerous and open to abuse’.53 The second 
reason Carruthers gives is that ‘[a] rule withholding moral standing from those who are 
very young, very old, or mentally defective is…likely to produce social instability, that 
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many people would find themselves psychologically incapable of living in compliance 
with it’.54  
 
Neither of the reasons Carruthers gives, however, are principled reasons for marginal 
humans having moral status. Indeed, it is unclear in what sense marginal humans have 
moral status in Carruthers’ view. If having moral status is, as Carruthers believes, an 
upshot of having intelligence of the level of a rational agent, then marginal humans do 
not actually have moral status. The claim seems to be, rather, that there is reason to 
pretend that marginal humans have moral status. This pretending is not going to be good 
enough for many people’s intuitions. And, if pretending is going to be good enough, then 
one might point out that it could reasonably be suggested that ‘many people would find 
themselves psychologically incapable of living in compliance with’55 a rule withholding 
moral standing from cats and dogs. We are accustomed to treating our cats and dogs 
much like our children in many respects. Does that mean cats and dogs suddenly acquire 
moral status? The more important point though is that, even if Carruthers’ two reasons 
are accepted, they do not demonstrate why having intelligence of the level of a rational 
agent should be determinative of having of moral status. Carruthers relies on the 
assumption that only rational agents can make a social contract to demonstrate this, but it 
will be seen that we can in fact make a social contract with parties that are not rational 
agents. Furthermore, The Principle of Desert can be employed to demonstrate that 
intelligence is not a morally relevant difference between humans and animals. 
 
1.3 THE PRINCIPLE OF DESERT 
 
In addition to the Principle of Equal Consideration, Rowlands claims that the Principle of 
Desert also plays an ‘enormous role in shaping our moral thinking’.56 The two principles 
should be understood as functioning in tandem with each other. The Principle of Equal 
Consideration is based on the idea that there can be ‘no moral difference without some 
other relevant difference’. The Principle of Desert tells us which differences are not 
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moral ones. It tells us that differences that we have not in any way earned or merited—
those that are beyond our control—are not moral ones.57 People should get what they 
deserve, and people do not deserve lesser or greater consideration because of things 
beyond their control.  
 
The ‘fundamental moral entitlement’, Rowlands says, is the ‘entitlement to be treated 
with equal consideration’.58 This, of course, is the Principle of Equal Consideration. Any 
other entitlements that we have almost certainly, Rowlands claims, derive from this one. 
Against this background, the Principle of Desert amounts to this: ‘your entitlement to be 
treated with equal consideration cannot be diminished or increased by things or 
circumstances over which you have no control’.59 And it has already been hinted that 
equal consideration will be seen to entail an equal place among the negotiators of a social 
contract, and an equal place among the negotiators determines one’s membership in the 
moral community, so the Principle of Desert says that one’s membership in the moral 
community cannot be denied because of circumstances over which you have no control.  
 
A person’s intelligence is not something that a person generally has much control over. 
Within certain limits, the intelligence of a person is a matter of the way they are born, or 
of early childhood influences; and neither of these are things over which the person has 
much control.
60
 So, a person lacking in intelligence does not deserve less than equal 
consideration because of this, and nor does an animal. All this amounts to is that an 
animal’s relevantly similar interests should not be given less consideration than a normal 
adult human’s merely because animals are less intelligent than normal adult humans, 
since this difference is not one either is responsible for.  
 
Rowlands fails to point out that only moral agents can be truly responsible for differences 
between themselves and others, so the Principle of Desert is only ever going to justify 
giving the relevantly similar interests of moral agents less, or more, consideration than 
                                                 
57
 Rowlands (2002), p. 48. 
58
 Ibid, p. 51. 
59
 Ibid. 
60
 Ibid, p. 49. 
27 
 
that due to other members of the moral community. And, even then, with the Principle of 
Desert only being applied in this thesis to determine placement among the negotiators of 
a social contract, it is not clear that there is any controllable property moral agents might 
possess that should comprise their equal place among the negotiators.
61
 So the Principle 
of Desert might be taken to imply simply that there are no moral differences, because 
there are no other relevant differences. That would mean that nothing and no one is to be 
denied membership in the moral community. It will be seen in the next chapter that this 
is, in fact, what Rowlands proposes.   
 
Of course the most obvious difference between humans and animals is species 
membership, but here again we have no control over this feature of ourselves, and the 
Principle of Desert ‘tells us’, as Rowlands puts it, ‘that any feature that we have for 
which we are not responsible, hence have not in any way earned or merited, is not a 
morally relevant feature’.62  Together with the Principle of Equal Consideration, this 
entails, he says, that ‘animals deserve less consideration than us only if there is some 
difference between us and them which we have earned or merited’.63 But, as Rowlands 
notes, there is no such difference. The species to which one belongs is not something 
over which one has any control. Therefore, species is morally irrelevant. 
 
All this means that animals deserve to be treated with consideration equal to that 
accorded human beings. Of course, as previously noted, equal consideration does not 
require identical treatment, but, rather, the equal consideration of relevantly similar 
interests. Thus, we are not required, for example, to educate pigs, for they have no 
interest in being educated. However, Rowlands steers away from confronting the point 
                                                 
61
 For one thing, it is not clear how responsible moral agents really are for many of their actions, since the 
circumstances one finds oneself born into have such a strong influence on our actions. And, even if moral 
agents should be held responsible for their actions, there are probably more appropriate ways of holding 
them responsible than increasing or decreasing their place among the negotiators of a social contract. Rawls 
himself did not allow considerations of desert to influence the distribution of wealth and income, since 
desert derives from features of ourselves that are ultimately beyond our control. It just happens that the 
most productive members of a Rawlsian society will typically get more wealth and income because such 
inequality of wealth and income tends to make the least advantaged better off. So, while it appears that 
desert gets some consideration in Rawls’ system, this appearance is only a side effect of the maximin rule 
(Rawls (1999), p. 133). 
62
 Rowlands (2002), p. 53. 
63
Ibid. 
28 
 
that the obligation to give the relevantly similar interests of animals equal consideration 
will assert itself whenever we seek to further human interests, and we constantly seek to 
further human interests through our systems of law and social security. It is this point that 
is substantially considered in Chapter Four of this thesis.  
 
The Principle of Equal Consideration and the Principle of Desert each, Rowlands claims, 
provide a ‘powerful argument’ for animal liberation on their own, and, put together, ‘the 
strength of the case is increased even more’.64 To summarize, the Principle of Equal 
Consideration says that, ‘whether or not you are human, you are morally entitled to as 
much consideration as anyone else, as long as there are no morally relevant differences 
between you and others’.65 The Principle of Desert says, in effect, that ‘if you have no 
control over the differences between you and others—human or not—then those 
differences are not morally relevant ones’.66 And equal consideration involves the equal 
consideration of relevantly similar interests.  
 
However, as Rowlands acknowledges, the claim that the concept of equal consideration 
can be interpreted as the claim that all relevantly similar interests should be accorded 
equal moral consideration or ‘equal moral weight’ is incomplete.67  Rowlands is still 
operating, at this point in his argument, at the level of broad abstract principle. He still 
needs to work out what is involved in giving equal moral consideration (or weight) to 
relevantly similar interests. This debate is, he says, one of the central concerns of moral 
theory.
68
 And, in Rowlands’ view, what the broad moral theories do is offer different 
understandings of what is involved in giving equal moral consideration/weight to 
relevantly similar interests. What counts, he says, as equal consideration ‘varies from one 
moral theory to another’.69 And it follows from this that there can be no ‘theory-neutral 
conception of the Principle of Equal Consideration’.70 Thus a broad moral theory must be 
chosen at this point to elaborate what is involved in giving equal moral weight to relevant 
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similar interests. As explained in the introduction, this thesis will treat Rowlands’ Neo-
Rawlsianism as the representative of the approach of applying a broad moral theory to 
make a moral argument for animal liberation. The broad moral theory Rowlands’ Neo-
Rawlsianism applies to this end is social contract theory, and so it is that theory that is 
chosen here to elaborate what is involved in applying the Principle of Equal 
Consideration and the Principle of Desert to our treatment of animals. 
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Chapter 2 
Rowlands’ Vision of a Social Contract with Animals 
 
 
2.1 SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY AS A MORAL THEORY 
 
Social contract theory has a long and rich history, and, rather than being a single theory, 
would be better described as a group of theories. Thus there is sometimes reference to the 
‘social contract tradition’ or ‘social contract approach’.71 Following Rowlands, this thesis 
will focus on two varieties of social contract theory. However, before those two varieties 
are distinguished, it is important to note that a social contract theory may be offered as a 
moral theory (that provides us with principles of morality), a theory of justice (that 
provides us with principles of distributive justice), a theory of moral obligation (that 
explains why we are obliged to be moral), or a theory of political obligation (that explains 
why we are obliged to be lawful).  
 
John Rawls in his book, A Theory of Justice
72
 uses a social contract device to provide us 
with principles of distributive justice only. His principles of justice only purport to make 
prescriptions in respect of ‘the way in which the major social institutions distribute 
fundamental rights and duties and determine the division of advantages from social 
cooperation’.73 Although Thomas Scanlon in his book, What We Owe to Each Other74 
does use a social contract device to provide us with principles of morality more generally, 
he suggests that his theory may not be a theory of the whole of morality, and may only be 
a theory of what we owe to other persons, entailing that our obligations to animals may 
need to be derived from another part of morality.
75
 This thesis, however, will follow 
Rowlands in his use of a social contract device to provide us with principles of morality 
that do cover our obligations to animals. Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is a modification 
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of Rawls’ social contract device, and it is in reference to the fact that Rawls’ device 
provides us with principles of distributive justice only that Rowlands in his book, Animal 
Rights, writes that: 
 
I propose to use the contractarian [i.e. social contract] idea in a somewhat broader sense 
as providing a general theory of morality; that is, as providing a framework for the 
assignation of moral rights and duties in general, and not just political rights of the sort 
discussed by Rawls. That is, the contractarian idea, as I propose to use it…, will be 
conceived of as, in principle, being capable of providing us with general principles of 
morality, and not simply principles relating individuals to basic societal structures. While 
this differs in scope from Rawls’s view, this application of the contract idea is, of course, 
by no means idiosyncratic.
76
 
 
It is uncertain whether Rowlands would describe his Neo-Rawlsianism as an account of 
the whole of morality,
77
 but it will become clear that he, unlike Scanlon, regards our 
obligations to animals as falling within the part of morality his Neo-Rawlsianism 
provides an account of.  
 
The limited scope of Rawls’ and Scanlon’s respective theories should warn against 
arriving at the conclusion that neither would endorse us having significant duties to 
animals merely because we do not have such duties to animals within their accounts. 
Their accounts are not accounts of the whole of morality—specifically, they are not 
accounts of our obligations to animals
78—and so no such conclusion can be arrived at. 
Whether, and how, Neo-Rawlsianism can be applied at the same time Rawls’ theory or 
Scanlon’s theory is applied is a matter of some interest, but it is a matter beyond the 
scope of this thesis. 
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2.2 THE VARIETIES OF SOCIAL CONTRACT THEORY 
 
There are broadly two importantly different varieties of social contract theory.
79
 Both 
varieties recognise that people are, by nature, equal, but offer different conceptions of our 
natural equality. The first form of social contract theory derives straightforwardly from 
the work of Thomas Hobbes, and, like him, emphasizes a natural rough equality of power 
possessed by most human beings, which makes it mutually advantageous for people to 
make conventions that recognise and protect each other’s interests and possessions. This 
variety of social contract theory has been labelled ‘Hobbesian contractarianism’.80 The 
other variety of social contract theory has its roots in the work of Immanuel Kant, and is 
of a very different character to the Hobbesian variety; it emphasises the moral equality of 
individuals—the idea that fundamentally every person matters equally and is, therefore, 
entitled to equal consideration and respect. This second variety of social contract theory 
has been labelled ‘Kantian contractarianism’.81 
 
2.2.1 Hobbesian Contractarianism 
 
In his Leviathan, Hobbes contends that principles of law and morality emerge only from 
the artificial political agreements humans reach as the means of escaping the dangerous 
uncertainty of their ‘natural’ condition—a state he describes as a ‘war of every man 
against every man’,82 otherwise known as the ‘state of nature’. In the ‘state of nature’, 
individual humans are equal in the sense that all humans are roughly equal, so the theory 
goes, in strength and skill, and so any human is capable of killing any other: ‘The 
weakest has strength enough to kill the strongest, either by secret machination or by 
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confederacy with others’.83 Humans in the ‘state of nature’ must compete for resources in 
an environment of scarcity. Living thus ‘without a common power to keep them all in 
awe’, human beings have no natural principles of morality, according to Hobbes, by 
which to regulate the competition for resources: 
 
To this war of every man against every man, this also is consequent; that nothing can be 
unjust. The notions of right and wrong, justice and injustice, have there no place. Where 
there is no common power, there is no law; where no law, no injustice. Force and fraud 
are in war the two cardinal virtues. Justice and injustice are none of the faculties neither 
of the body nor mind. If they were, they might be in a man that were alone in the world, 
as well as his senses and passions. They are qualities that relate to men in society, not in 
solitude. It is consequent also to the same condition that there be no propriety, no 
dominion, no mine and thine distinct; but only that to be every man’s that he can get, and 
for so long as he can keep it.
84
 
 
Hobbesian contractarians, likewise, contend that there is ‘nothing objectively right or 
wrong either about the goals one chooses or the means by which one pursues these 
goals’.85  They do not subscribe to any notion that it is inherently wrong to harm others in 
pursuing one’s own goals. Though, while they do not consider it to be inherently wrong 
to harm others, they observe that it is often imprudent to harm others. I am going to be 
better off refraining from harming you if you, and everyone else, refrain from harming 
me in return. A social contract, therefore, that forbids harming others is going to be 
mutually advantageous; it will mean that we do not have to waste resources, time and 
effort defending ourselves and our property, and it will enable us to engage in stable and 
mutually-beneficial cooperation. While Hobbesian contractarians do not consider it to be 
inherently or objectively wrong to harm others, they do consider it prudent to deal with 
acts of harming others as if they were wrong.
86
 
 
The basis of morality, according to Hobbesian contractarians, is to be understood as a 
social contract consisting of whatever rules of conduct are the most mutually 
advantageous. The content of the social contract is the result of a negotiating process in 
which each person will want to bargain for the maximal furtherance of their own interests 
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and the minimal hindrance of their freedom. Whether or not Hobbes believed this 
negotiating process to be a historical reality, it is better understood as a hypothetical 
bargaining of the form: ‘What conventions would we agree to as mutually advantageous 
if we were to find ourselves in a position of the rough equality that characterizes the state 
of nature?’ The principles of morality established by this hypothetical negotiating process 
are to be obeyed not because it is inherently immoral to disobey them, but, ultimately, 
because it is imprudent to disobey them. It is only in this sense that the Hobbesian social 
contract can be thought of as yielding principles of morality.
87
 
 
There is perhaps a sense in which mutually advantageous agreements supply principles of 
morality, but principles of morality thus derived are of a different character compared to 
more a traditional conception of what qualify as principles of morality.
88
 They are of a 
different character because, according to Hobbesian contractarians, whether it is 
advantageous to adopt a particular principle depends on one’s bargaining power. Strong 
and talented persons have greater power than weak and talentless persons; weak and 
talentless persons produce little of value, and whatever value is produced by them can be 
easily appropriated by the strong without fear of retaliation. Strong and talented persons 
have little or nothing to gain from cooperating with weak and talentless persons, and 
nothing to fear, by way of retaliation from them. Therefore, strong and talented persons 
have little or no prudential reason to accept principles of morality which help weak and 
talentless persons.
89
 
 
Hobbesian contractarianism seems to entail that it is legitimate to allow weak and 
talentless people to be killed, enslaved or exploited. It seems that, for the Hobbesian 
contractarian, infants and marginal humans must fall outside the moral community. The 
constraints of morality, for the Hobbesian contractarian, only exist between individuals 
who are roughly equal in physical power. Indeed, it would seem that even rough equality 
of physical power is not enough to gain membership in the moral community under 
Hobbesian contractarianism.  
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Within those times and places that slavery has existed, slaves have typically been roughly 
equal in physical power to their masters. The masters, therefore, would have found it 
advantageous to make a social contract with their slaves in the state of nature prohibiting 
slavery, since the socio-political power structures upholding slavery and disempowering 
the slaves would not exist in the state of nature making the slaves a potential threat. 
However, Hobbesian contractarians do not believe that there is any moral standard that 
precedes a social contract and that could be used to stipulate that a social contract should 
be negotiated in a state of nature without contemporary socio-political power structures 
in place. Provided that the socio-political power structures that uphold slavery are stable 
in a society, the slaves in that society will not pose a potential threat to the masters 
sufficient enough for it to be prudent for the masters to allow the slaves a seat at the 
social contract bargaining table, i.e. membership in the moral community. And so there 
would be nothing immoral, according to Hobbesian contractarians, about slavery 
continuing in that society, since its continuance would presumably be more advantageous 
to the masters than its discontinuance would. But, intuitively, slavery is immoral in any 
society. 
 
Common criticisms of Hobbesian contractarianism focus on its conflict with our intuitive 
understanding of morality.
90
 Rowlands offers such a criticism when he contends that our 
intuitive understanding of morality: 
 
tells us that any mutually beneficial activity must, in order to be legitimate, first respect 
the rights of others, including, crucially, the rights of those too weak to defend their 
interests. And, therefore, according to our ordinary intuitive conception of morality, 
mutual advantage cannot be the foundation of morality, for there are considerations of 
morality that are prior to the pursuit of mutual advantage.
91
  
 
This, he acknowledges, can hardly be regarded as a refutation of Hobbesian 
contractarianism: one obviously cannot refute Hobbesian contractarianism by appealing 
to our intuitive understanding of morality, when the crux of the theory is that our intuitive 
understanding of morality is seriously mistaken. According to Hobbesian contractarians, 
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there is no objective morality, and hence there are no objective rights or duties. Claiming, 
therefore, that Hobbesian contractarianism ignores the right of the weak and talentless to 
our protection does not amount to an argument against the theory, since the existence of 
such rights, as Rowlands admits, is precisely what is at issue.
92
 
 
However, while the objection to Hobbesian contractarianism that it conflicts with our 
intuitive understanding of morality begs the question, it is enough to demonstrate that 
Hobbesian contractarianism is patently incompatible with the idea that all human beings 
have equal moral status, i.e. the Principle of Equal Consideration.
93
 In fact, Hobbesian 
contractarians would explicitly deny this.
94
 The moral status of an individual, on the 
Hobbesian view, is a function of their power. There is no room in Hobbesian 
contractarianism, then, for the Principle of Equal Consideration or the Principle of Desert 
(since the two principles function in tandem). But Rowlands claims that these principles 
are etched deeply into our moral community, and consequently into the moral 
consciousness of each one of us, and so we should reject any moral theory that is 
inconsistent with them.
95
 If there is to be a social contract theory that embodies the 
Principle of Equal Consideration and the Principle of Desert, it will have to be other than 
Hobbesian in character. Thus Rowlands turns to Kantian contractarianism, as the variety 
of contractarianism that has the moral equality of individuals at its heart, and he embarks 
on a project of ridding it of all Hobbesian remnants to eventually arrive at his Neo-
Rawlsianism.  
 
2.2.2 Kantian Contractarianism 
 
While they are both varieties of contractarianism, the Hobbesian and Kantian varieties 
are quite different from each other. Hobbesian contractarianism is at one and the same 
time, a moral theory and a theory of moral obligation. It uses the idea of a social contract, 
not only to provide us with principles of morality, but also to explain why we are obliged 
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to be moral. The principles of morality provided by a Hobbesian social contract are those 
that persons in a state of nature would regard as mutually advantageous. We are obliged 
to respect those principles because we would agree to them in a state of nature, and so are 
disposed to agree to them, and we are so disposed out of prudence and self-interest.  
 
Kantian contractarianism uses the idea of a social contract in a fundamentally different 
way to Hobbesian contractarianism.
96
 While a Hobbesian social contract grounds 
morality by tying the principles of morality it provides back to prudence and self-interest, 
a Kantian social contract does not seek to ground morality in something non-moral. A 
Kantian social contract is a ‘heuristic device in terms of which’, Rowlands says, ‘we can 
identify and express the principles embodied, often in a partially concealed or implicit 
manner, in the moral code that we have, for whatever reason, in fact adopted.’97 For 
example, Rowlands continues, a Kantian social contract ‘can be used in this way to 
express and reflect the idea of the equal moral status of persons’.98 A Kantian social 
contract can be used in this way to eradicate, rather than reflect, differences in the 
bargaining powers of the negotiators of a social contract. 
 
The Hobbesian contractarian sees a social contract as constitutive of moral right and 
wrong: these being constituted or defined by the hypothetical agreement reached by 
persons in a ‘state of nature’. The Kantian contractarian, conversely, has at least a 
‘minimal conception of moral truth or objectivity’ that is independent of a social 
contract.
99
 We are obliged to be moral, according to the Kantian contractarian, just 
because being moral is the right way to be. And so a Kantian social contract will have 
authority to the extent that it embodies, or at least approximates, moral truth. The 
function of a Kantian social contract is, says Rowlands, to help us reveal or identify what 
is morally right and wrong, and that has this status independently of the contract itself.
100
 
Stated metaphorically: a Kantian social contract reflects moral truth, shining its light on 
moral practice, but is not itself the source of the light; a Hobbesian social contract is 
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intended to be the source of the light of moral truth, but the moral truth is reducible here 
to truths about prudence and self-interest.  
 
Given, Rowlands says, that the function of a Kantian social contract is revelatory, rather 
than constitutive, whether or not an individual who is deficient in point of bargaining 
power gets included in the Kantian moral community is dependent only on what the 
moral truth requires.
101
 Of course, since a Hobbesian social contract is constitutive of 
morality, i.e. what is mutually advantageous, whether or not an individual gets included 
in the negotiations, i.e. the Hobbesian moral community, is dependent on their bargaining 
power in the situation in which the contract is negotiated. It is also dependent on them 
being able to understand the terms of the contract and reciprocate in the ways required by 
it. The basis of morality for the Hobbesian contractarian is mutual advantage, so the 
principles of morality have to be advantageous to one in some real sense, and there is no 
advantage to be gained in pretending that those who cannot reciprocate, e.g. animals, can 
reciprocate, or that the powerless pose a potential threat.  
 
The moral truth may, of course, specify that an individual who is deficient in power or 
rationality, e.g. an animal, does not count morally. Rowlands notes that something like 
this may have been Kant’s view.102 In Kant’s view, a non-rational agent falls outside the 
scope of direct moral concern. The point though is that the discounting of a non-rational 
individual is something that requires, as Rowlands puts it, additional argument.
103
 In 
other words, it is not something that can be derived from the nature of a Kantian social 
contract. Those who assume that social contract theory must exclude animals from the 
moral community, generally base their assumption on the fact that animals are not 
capable of entering into a contract and reciprocating in the ways required by it. This is a 
good reason for believing that animals must be excluded from the Hobbesian moral 
community, but not for believing that they must be excluded from the Kantian moral 
community. A Kantian social contract should only ever reflect the moral truth; it should 
not, because of its nature, create the moral truth.   
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The moral truth that Rowlands seeks to reflect or elucidate through his version of Kantian 
contractarianism, i.e. Neo-Rawlsianism, is the Principle of Equal Consideration, which, 
he says, provides the cornerstone of contemporary moral thinking.
104
 And it was seen in 
Chapter One that the Principle of Equal Consideration, in tandem with the Principle of 
Desert, cannot justify the exclusion of animals from the moral community. Rowlands 
claims that most recent influential forms of contractarianism are unstable, and arguably 
untenable, mixtures of Hobbesian and Kantian forms of contractarianism.
105
 This, 
Rowlands says, is as true of Rawls’ account as it is of others. In Rawlsian 
contractarianism we find, he says, a Kantian core surrounded by ‘unexpurgated 
unfortunate, and unnecessary elements of Hobbesianism’.106 Much of the plausibility of 
Rawls’ account, he continues, stems from this Kantian core. And much of what is 
questionable about his account stems from the unnecessary Hobbesian residue. 
Rowlands’ goal, therefore, is ‘to exorcise Rawls of his Hobbesian demons, and so end up 
with a version of contractarianism that is truer to his underlying Kantian motivation and 
methodology than the one developed by Rawls himself’.107 
 
2.3 ROWLANDS’ NEO-RAWLSIANISM 
 
It is ‘almost universally assumed’, Rowlands writes, that social contract theory is 
incapable of underwriting the granting of direct moral status to animals.
108
 The reason for 
this almost universal assumption is, he says, that animals are not rational agents, and it is 
supposed that social contract theories subsume, under the umbrella of moral 
consideration, only rational agents.
109
 Rowlands quotes Carruthers as an example of this 
sort of thinking: 
 
Morality is here [i.e. according to social contract theory] pictured as a system of rules to 
govern the interaction of rational agents within society. It, therefore, seems inevitable, on 
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the face of it, that only rational agents will be assigned direct moral rights on this 
approach. Since it is rational agents who are to choose the system of rules, and choose 
self-interestedly, it is only rational agents who will have their position protected under the 
rules. There seems no reason why rights should be assigned to non-rational agents. 
Animals will, therefore, have no moral standing under Rawlsian contractarianism, in so 
far as they do not count as rational agents.
110
  
 
However, Rowlands argues that (Kantian) contractarianism does not necessitate that the 
protection afforded by a social contract only be afforded to rational agents. Though the 
negotiators of a social contract must of course be imagined as rational agents, he says, 
this does not necessitate that the recipients of the protection afforded by the contract are 
restricted to rational agents.
111
 The reason, Rowlands says, that so many people assume 
that social contract theory is unable to support the assigning of direct moral status to 
animals is that they do not distinguish between the Hobbesian and Kantian varieties of 
contractarianism. The Hobbesian variety does restrict the protection offered by a social 
contract to rational agents, but the Kantian variety, which Rowlands claims to be far more 
plausible and influential, can be used to underwrite the direct moral status of animals and 
other non-rational agents.
112
 
 
2.3.1 The Argument for Incompatibility 
 
Rowlands argues that animals possess moral rights, and that social contract theory is 
compatible with animals possessing moral rights. Moral rights, he says, are:  
 
(i) valid claims to a specific commodity, freedom, or treatment; (ii) made against 
assignable individuals who are capable of granting or withholding the commodity, 
freedom or treatment; where (iii) a claim is valid if it is backed or entailed by a correct 
moral theory.
113
  
 
Rowlands claims that his argument does not require this account of rights, but it is useful, 
he says, to have a fairly precise concept of rights at hand. That may be, but it seems that 
the main thing to keep in mind is that the key to animals attaining direct moral status and 
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membership in the moral community (within the context of social contract theory) is their 
participation in negotiating a social contract. Once it is acknowledged that animals should 
participate in those negotiations, they will have their interests furthered directly by the 
resulting principles, whether it be by the assignment of moral rights or otherwise.   
 
Rowlands suggests that the underlying argument for the assumed incompatibility of 
social contract theory and animal rights is of the following form: 
 
P1. According to social contract theory, moral rights and duties are dependent on the 
existence of an actual or hypothetical contract. 
P2. The negotiators of the contract and the moral rights and duties embodied therein 
have to be conceived of as rational agents. 
P3. Therefore, the contract and its embodied moral rights and duties apply only to 
rational agents (i.e. only rational agents are included in the moral community). 
P4. Animals are not rational agents. 
P5. Therefore, the contract and its embodied rights and duties do not apply to 
animals. 
P6. Direct moral rights are possessed only by those individuals subsumed by the 
contract and its embodied rights and duties. 
C. Therefore, animals do not possess direct moral rights.
114
 
 
Rowlands concedes that the argument for incompatibility, as he has presented it, is not 
deductively valid, and that it would be unfair to criticize it in this respect, given that he 
has presented it thus. Nonetheless, he says, there is still a large jump from P2 to P3. 
Though the negotiators of a social contract must necessarily be imagined as rational 
agents, this does not necessitate that the beneficiaries of the protection offered by a social 
contract must also be rational agents.
115
  
 
The argument for incompatibility can only be rendered plausible if some justification for 
the move from P2 to P3 can be provided. But all justifications found in the literature, 
according to Rowlands, seem to presuppose a Hobbesian form of social contract.
116
 
Clearly rationality is a prerequisite for participating in negotiating a social contract (i.e. 
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P2 is true), and animals are not rational agents (i.e. P4 is true), but it will be seen that 
animals can, nonetheless, participate, in effect, in negotiating a (Kantian) social contract. 
And it has already been seen that only a Hobbesian social contract excludes non-rational 
agents from the moral community by its contractual nature. A Kantian social contract 
merely elucidates the moral truth, which Rowlands takes to be the Principle of Equal 
Consideration as the cornerstone of contemporary moral thinking, and, as already stated, 
it was seen in Chapter One that this principle does not exclude non-rational agents from 
the moral community (i.e. it does not endorse P3).  
 
Rowlands argues that if we are consistent in taking the Kantian approach to the social 
contract, then there is no way of bridging the gap between P2 and P3. The leap from P2 
to P3 is, accordingly, he says, an unjustified one.
117
 
 
2.3.2 Rawlsian Contractarianism 
 
The starting point for Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is Rawls’ version of Kantian 
contractarianism as set out in his books, A Theory of Justice
118
 and Political 
Liberalism.
119
 It is to be kept in mind though that, while Rawls sets out a theory of justice 
in those books, Rowlands, as already noted, uses the social contract idea more broadly to 
provide a moral theory outlining a ‘framework for the assignation of moral rights and 
duties in general, and not just political rights of the sort discussed by Rawls’.120 
 
According to Rowlands, Rawls takes as his starting point the notion of the moral equality 
of individuals, i.e. the Principle of Equal Consideration, and uses a social contract device 
as a means of identifying and expressing exactly what is involved in this basic idea.
121
 
Society is composed of individuals with unequal bargaining power, and so, without some 
evening of the playing field, a social contract would give greater consideration to those 
with greater bargaining power. This does not derive from the nature of the social contract 
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device; it derives from the conditions under which the social contract is negotiated. A 
social contract can, however, give equal consideration to all of the negotiators of the 
contract regardless of their differing inherent power or abilities, though only if the 
negotiations take place in a position of equality.
122
 Rawls calls this position of equality 
the ‘original position’. The negotiators in the original position are in a position of 
equality because they find themselves behind a ‘veil of ignorance’. Being behind a veil of 
ignorance means that the negotiators have no knowledge of their natural talents and 
characteristics, their socio-economic position in society, or even their conception of the 
good, in the real world.  
 
The negotiators within the original position are imagined as rational. And each negotiator 
is still assumed to be trying to do the best they can for themselves—to formulate and 
advocate rules of conduct that will secure them maximum advantage as they exist in the 
society they are formulating the rules for. However, because of the epistemological 
restriction of the veil of ignorance, the effect of each negotiator trying to do the best they 
can for themselves under that restriction is that the negotiators are rationally compelled to 
try to do the best they can for all members of the society they are formulating rules for. 
From behind the veil of ignorance, trying to do the best one can for oneself requires 
trying to do the best one can for all. In the original position, deciding which principles 
will promote your good in the society you are formulating rules for, requires that you put 
yourself in the place of every other person in that society and consider what promotes 
that person’s good, since you may be any given person in that society. Agreements made 
in the original position thus give equal consideration to every member of society.
123
  
 
The way to conceive what would be a just organization of society in Rawls’s view is to 
conceive what principles of justices would be agreed on by negotiators in the original 
position and behind the veil of ignorance; and Rawls claims that the negotiators would 
agree on the two principles of justice set out in his book, A Theory of Justice.
124
 
Rowlands, however, points out that the concept of the original position cannot, by itself, 
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motivate Rawls’ principles of justice. Rawls, he says, has, in fact, two key arguments for 
his principles of justice; not just the one.
125
 The first of these arguments Rowlands calls 
the ‘Intuitive Equality Argument’; the second he calls the ‘Social Contract Argument’. 
The Social Contract Argument is the argument that Rawls’ principles of justice are the 
principles of justice that would be agreed on by rational agents in the original position. 
Rowlands contends that understanding the relation between the Intuitive Equality 
Argument and the Social Contract Argument is essential to understanding the way in 
which social contract theory can support the attribution of direct rights to animals.
126
 
 
2.3.2.1 The Intuitive Equality Argument 
 
Rowlands sets out the basis of the Intuitive Equality Argument as follows: 
 
P1. If an individual I is not responsible for their possession of property P, then I is 
not morally entitled to P. 
P2. If I is not morally entitled to P, then I is not morally entitled to whatever benefits 
accrue from their possession of P. 
P3. For any individual I, there will be a certain set of properties S = {P1, P2 … Pn} 
such that I possesses S without being responsible for possessing S. 
C. Therefore, for any individual I, there is a set S of properties such that I is not 
morally entitled to the benefits which accrue from possession of S.
127
 
 
In other words, ‘if a property is undeserved in the sense that its possessor is not 
responsible for, or has done nothing to merit, its possession, then its possessor is not 
morally entitled to whatever benefits accrue from that possession’.128 This appears to be 
simply the Principle of Desert restated into an argument, and Rawls, according to 
Rowlands, believes that this argument underlies the ideal of equality of opportunity 
which he identifies with the prevailing liberal orthodoxy.
129
 Thus, it seems that the 
Principle of Desert is, in essence, the Principle of Equal Opportunity, and perhaps would 
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be better labelled as such, given the associations of the concept of ‘desert’, but Rowlands’ 
labels will be persisted with for sake of simplicity.  
 
2.3.2.2 The Social Contract Argument 
 
Rawls’ Social Contract Argument has already been described. It consists in the derivation 
of his principles of justice from his concepts of the original position and the veil of 
ignorance.  
 
2.3.2.3 The Mutual Dependence of the Arguments 
 
The Social Contract Argument receives a lot more emphasis and attention from Rawls, 
than does the Intuitive Equality Argument, leading to the latter argument being 
overlooked.
130
 But Rowlands contends that neither argument can be understood 
independently of the other; they are, he says, co-dependent and mutually reinforcing. 
 
Rawls has been criticized for rigging the description of the veil of ignorance, and thus the 
original position, in order to yield his principles of justice. ‘This sort of objection is, 
however, misconceived’, says Rowlands, ‘since Rawls is perfectly willing to admit 
this’.131  Rawls recognizes that ‘for each traditional conception of justice there is an 
interpretation of the initial situation [i.e. the original position] in which its principles are 
the preferred solution’.132  
 
The original position can be set up in number of different ways without upsetting its 
claim to satisfy the requirements of procedural fairness, and Rawls’ principles of justice 
would not be chosen in all those versions of the original position. To ascertain which 
principles of justice and morality would be agreed in the original position, we, therefore, 
need to first ascertain which version of the original position to adopt; the key to which, 
according to Rawls, is that the version of the original position elected should result in 
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principles of justice and morality being agreed that we find intuitively acceptable. In 
other words, we can justify opting for one version of the original position over another on 
the grounds that one produces the principles which emerge from the Intuitive Equality 
Argument. This, says Rowlands, is so because ‘it is precisely this argument which is 
based on the principles embodied in our contemporary liberal ideology’.133 
 
2.3.3 Neo-Rawlsian Contractarianism 
 
As noted, and as Rawls himself would point out, there are various possible ways in which 
the original position could be set up. Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is based on a version 
of the original position shaped by the Principle of Equal Consideration and the Principle 
of Desert that he labels the ‘impartial position’.134 Any version of the original position is 
going to be shaped by the Principle of Equal Consideration. If you do not know who you 
are in the original position, then you have no way, as Rowlands puts it, of being biased 
toward yourself; any grounds for bias have been removed by the veil of ignorance.
135
 
 
It has been seen that Rawls’ Social Contract Argument is, at least in Rowlands’ analysis, 
co-dependent on the Intuitive Equality Argument, which is essentially the Principle of 
Desert. And, while Rawls does implement the Principle of Desert in describing the 
original position as he does, Rowlands’ contention is that Rawls does not go far enough 
in implementing this principle. The basis of Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is that a more 
consistent and thorough implementation of the Principle of Desert would transform the 
original position into the impartial position.
136
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The Principle of Desert provides justification for denying the negotiators in the impartial 
position knowledge about those features, which they possess in the society they are 
formulating rules for, and which they have no control over. Knowledge of features of 
ourselves like sex, ethnicity, and natural intellectual and physical aptitudes, is denied 
behind the veil of ignorance because these are features which we have no control over. 
They are, as Rowlands puts it, ‘features that we have in no way earned or merited’137—in 
the language of the Intuitive Equality Argument, they are properties we are not 
responsible for possessing. Within the impartial position, knowledge of which of these 
properties the negotiators possess in the society they are formulating rules for is excluded 
by the veil of ignorance because they are morally irrelevant features—and they are 
morally irrelevant because we have no control over whether or not we have them.
138
 
 
2.3.3.1 The Exclusion of Knowledge of Species 
 
Rowlands urges us to consider the property of belong to a particular species: ‘Is this 
something over which you have any control? ‘Is it something you in any way earned or 
merited? ‘Clearly not’.139 We are simply born a member of a particular species, and thus 
the property of belonging to the species we do is an undeserved property. Applying the 
Principle of Desert, we have to admit that our belonging to the species we do is just as 
morally arbitrary as our sex, ethnicity and eye colour. In the impartial position, 
knowledge of one’s species in the real world is, thus, just another thing that should be 
denied behind the veil of ignorance. And, since knowledge of one’s species should be 
excluded behind the veil of ignorance, so too should knowledge of those features that are 
tied to being a member of a particular species. This means that knowledge of one’s innate 
intellectual endowments and capacities for complex rational inference should be excluded 
behind the veil of ignorance for we have no control over whether or not we have them.
140
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2.3.3.2 Moral Agents, Moral Patients and Mere Things 
 
Rowlands claims that one of the advantages of the impartial position over Rawls’ original 
position, is that the impartial position allows us to be properly sensitive to the distinction 
between moral agents and moral patients.
141
 According to Rawls, his account of justice 
applies only to individuals who have what he calls a ‘sense of justice’. And you have a 
sense of justice only if you are capable of thinking and acting morally. In other words, the 
original position is restricted to moral and rational agents. One of the things the 
negotiators know in Rawls’ original position is that they are moral agents. And this 
means that moral patients, i.e. animals and marginal humans, fall outside the scope of 
Rawlsian contractarianism.  
 
However, whether you are a moral agent or a moral patient is something beyond your 
control, and so knowledge of this fact is something that should be denied the negotiators 
in the impartial position. This being so, it would be irrational in the impartial position for 
the negotiators of a social contract to agree upon principles of morality that favour moral 
agents, since the negotiators do not know whether they will be a moral agent in the 
society they are negotiating principles of morality for; they could well end up being an 
animal or a marginal human. And an irrational choice in the impartial position is an 
immoral choice in the real world.
142
 
 
Of course, whether or not you are something that is neither a moral agent nor a moral 
patient, i.e. a non-sentient mere thing, is also something beyond your control, and so the 
negotiators in the impartial position should be denied knowledge of whether or not they 
are even sentient in the society they are negotiating principles for. And this would appear 
to result in the absurdity of mere things, e.g. plants and rocks and toothbrushes, being 
accorded moral rights. However, this absurdity does not result because it is rational to 
discriminate against mere things in the impartial position. The reason is that, if you are 
neither a moral agent nor a moral patient (i.e. if you are not even sentient) in the society 
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you are negotiating principles for, then you (from your perspective within impartial 
position) simply will not be concerned what happens to you (in the real world)—and 
rationally so.  
 
Within Neo-Rawlsianism, the limits of morality are determined by what the negotiators 
in the impartial position should rationally be concerned about. That is, membership of the 
moral community is limited to beings or things that a negotiator could rationally worry 
about being.
143
 A negotiator can worry about being a sentient animal, since there is 
something it is like to be one. Sentient animals can suffer, and so when a negotiator 
considers that they might be a sentient animal in the society they are negotiating 
principles for, they will want to negotiate principles that protect sentient animals from 
suffering. But when a negotiator considers that they might be something non-sentient in 
the society they are negotiating principles for, they will not be concerned to negotiate 
principles that protect non-sentient mere things.  
 
When a negotiator imagines themselves as something non-sentient, they find there is 
nothing to imagine, since there is nothing it is like to be a mere thing, and so no principle 
they negotiate will make things go better or worse for them if they turn out to be a mere 
thing. It makes perfect sense, therefore, for a negotiator to make sentience the cut-off 
point for inclusion in the moral community. For the same reason it is this feature that 
demarcates moral agents and patients from mere things, since the mark of a moral patient 
is inclusion within the moral community, and moral agents are those beings that further 
have the capacity for moral reasoning.  
 
2.3.3.3 The Impartial Position 
 
Martha Nussbaum, in her book Frontiers of Justice, writes that: 
                                                 
143
 It was stated in the last chapter that Rowlands proposes that nothing and no one is to be denied 
membership in the moral community. Membership in the moral community equates to an equal place 
among the negotiators of a social contract. Non-sentient beings and things must be given an equal place, 
but they do not bother to negotiate because nothing will increase or decrease their suffering, since they do 
not suffer. Whether you want to say this places them inside or outside the moral community is not a matter 
of any consequence. 
50 
 
 
In a very basic way, the whole idea of a contract involving both humans and nonhuman 
animals is fantastic, suggesting no clear scenario that would assist our thinking. Although 
the state of nature is not supposed to be an actual historical condition, it is supposed to be 
a coherent fiction that can help us think well. This means that it has to have realism, at 
least, concerning the powers and needs of the parties and their basic circumstances. There 
is no comparable fiction about our decision to make a deal with other animals that would 
be similarly coherent and helpful.…[T]he asymmetry of power between humans and 
nonhuman animals is too great to imagine any contract we might make with them as a 
real contract. Certainly we cannot imagine that the contract would actually be for mutual 
advantage: for if we want to protect ourselves from the incursions of threatening animals 
we can just kill them, as we do.…Thus the Rawlsian condition that no one party to the 
contract is strong enough to dominate or kill all the others is not met. Furthermore, 
because animals do not make contracts, we are blocked, here again, from imagining 
plausibly what a social compact would look like. The type of intelligence that animals 
possess is not the sort that we need to postulate to imagine a contractual process.
144
 
 
The first thing to note is that a Kantian social contract is not for mutual advantage; the 
fact that a social contract with animals would not be mutually advantageous only 
succeeds in ruling out making a Hobbesian social contract with animals. The ‘Rawlsian 
condition’, Nussbaum mentions, that ‘no one party to the contract is strong enough to 
dominate or kill all the others’145 is a Hobbesian condition that has found its way into 
Rawls’ thinking, and relates back to the fact that those strong enough to dominate or kill 
the weak gain no advantage in contracting with them. As has been seen, the purpose of a 
Kantian social contract is not mutual advantage, but rather to elucidate the Principle of 
Equal Consideration and the Principle of Desert. And since Neo-Rawlsianism is supposed 
to present a purely Kantian form of social contract, it is no criticism of it to point out that 
a Neo-Rawlsian social contract is not for mutual advantage. 
 
However, Nussbaum’s allegation that the idea of a social contract involving humans and 
animals does not assist our thinking is an allegation that requires greater attention, since 
Rowlands describes the impartial position as a ‘heuristic device: an aid to thinking’.146 
Nussbaum contends that a social contract ‘has to have realism, at least, concerning the 
powers and needs of the parties and their basic circumstances’147 in order to be a coherent 
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and helpful aid to thinking. Of course Nussbaum is entirely correct that the idea of a 
contract involving humans and animals is ‘fantastic’,148 but one wonders why she failed 
to consider that the negotiators of a social contract could be entirely rational (and so 
capable of complex negotiations) behind the veil of ignorance, and yet be denied 
knowledge by the veil of whether they are rational agents in the society they are 
negotiating principles for. It is an elegantly simple means of enabling social contract 
theory to include animals in the moral community. And it suggests a similarly simple 
method for assessing the morality of animal-related practices: imagine you are a rational 
self-interested negotiator in the impartial position that might, when the veil of ignorance 
is lifted, be an animal affected by the practice or a human benefited by it, and assess 
whether you would agree to the practice in those circumstances. Then simply apply what 
Rowlands calls the ‘golden rule’: if a choice is irrational in the impartial position, then it 
is immoral in the real world.
149
 
 
It may still be objected though that we simply cannot imagine ourselves in the impartial 
position stripped so thoroughly of our self-knowledge that we do not even know whether 
we are human. Rowlands, however, clarifies that when we talk of the impartial position, 
we are not talking about a situation you might literally find yourself in. In fact, he says, 
the impartial position is not even a possible or imaginable situation, let alone an actual 
one.
150
 No one can lack knowledge of all their unearned properties, or even imagine 
themselves lacking all this knowledge. To be ‘in’ the impartial position, Rowlands says, 
is to be reasoning in accordance with certain restrictions. You are in the impartial 
position when you reason in the following sort of way: ‘As a matter of fact, I have 
property P (e.g. being male), but, if I did not know whether I have P, what principles of 
morality would I like to see people adopt?’ You are ‘in’ the impartial position, in the only 
meaningful sense in which you can ever be in it, when you engage in a process of 
reasoning of this type.
151
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In the impartial position, property P could be any unearned property, e.g. gender, race, 
species, intelligence, moral agency. To be in the impartial position, Rowlands says, you 
have to repeat this reasoning process for all unearned properties; all of them have to be 
put behind the veil of ignorance. However, there is no need to put all your unearned 
properties simultaneously behind the veil. All that you need to do, according to 
Rowlands, to be in the impartial position, is to ask yourself about each of your unearned 
properties in turn.
152
  
 
Also, which property you bracket will depend, Rowlands says, on which question you are 
trying to answer. Rowlands explains:  
 
If you are trying to work out how to construct a society free of racial discrimination, then 
ask yourself: “I have the property of being white (or black, or whatever). But suppose I 
didn’t have this property. How would I like the world to be then?” For the question of 
how we should treat animals, however, the central question is: “I have the property of 
being human. But suppose I didn’t have this property. How would I like the world to be 
then?” Indeed, we can be a lot more specific than this. Suppose, for example, we were 
trying to work out the moral status of veal farming. Then, the impartial position simply 
requires that we pretend we don’t know if we are a human or a veal calf. Then, we ask 
ourselves, “How would I like the world to be?” That is, would we prefer it if the world 
contained the practice of veal farming or would we prefer it if it didn’t?153 
 
Rowlands compares this process to repairing the ship of Theseus while still at sea.
154
 In 
order to avoid being partial to a particular distribution of moral principles on the basis of 
one’s possessing a given property, he says, one simply has to imagine not having that 
property and asking oneself what moral principles one would like to see adopted in that 
situation. Identification of the most adequate set of moral principles, then, is simply, he 
says, a matter of collating the results from these sort of piecemeal inquiries.  
 
There is something less than satisfactory about these sort of piecemeal inquiries. It would 
seem though that much of this dissatisfaction derives from our familiarity with Rawls’ 
theory of justice. Rawls manages to use a social contract device to arrive at two clear and 
simple principles of justice that (along with a couple of priority rules) can provide a 
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scheme for the just ordering the basic structure of society; whereas Rowlands never gets 
as far as collating the results of his piecemeal inquiries into a set of moral principles. He 
only gets as far as presenting various animal-related practices and using the impartial 
position to determine whether or not each of these would be consented to by the 
negotiators in the impartial position, i.e. whether or not each is morally permissible.  
 
Rawls does, however, have the advantage over Rowlands in this respect, in that Rawls is 
presenting a theory of justice, and so has set himself the comparatively simple task of 
selecting which principles should govern the distribution of basic social goods. There are 
only a handful of reasonable schemes for the distribution of basic social goods, so the 
task of the negotiators in Rawls’ original position is relatively straightforward: pick a 
scheme. Rowlands does make the task of the negotiators in his impartial position 
similarly straightforward: pick which animal-related practices you would and would not 
consent to. This strategy appears to work quite well, since Rowlands discusses animal-
related practices that we can easily accept or reject when we place ourselves in the 
impartial position. However, it will be seen in Chapter Four that Neo-Rawlsianism 
presents a real challenge to our moral reasoning. Rowlands encourages us to ask 
ourselves when we place ourselves in the impartial position how we would like the world 
to be. Designing worlds though is rather more challenging than picking a scheme for the 
distribution of basic social goods. Such a challenging task invites disagreement, and the 
strength of social contract theory lies in its ability to reach consensus among the 
negotiators (with the help of some manipulation of the situation in which the negotiations 
take place).  
 
The more obvious objection to the idea of imagining, within the impartial position, that 
one might be an animal in the society one is negotiating principles for, is that it is more 
than challenging to imagine what it is like to be an animal; it seems downright impossible 
to imagine this. But Rowlands responds that the idea of imagining is an ambiguous 
one.
155
 Suppose, he says, you are to imagine yourself not being male. This could mean 
either that you imagine that you are female, or that you imagine what it is like to be 
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female. If you are male, then in order to be in the impartial position with respect to 
questions about gender equality, you only have to imagine that you are not male (or 
rather that you do not know whether you are male). You do not have to imagine what it is 
like to not be male. Similarly, you do not need in the impartial position to imagine what it 
is like to be an animal, in order to imagine that you are not human (or rather that you do 
not know whether you are).  
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Chapter 3 
Rowlands’ Argument for Vegetarianism 
 
 
3.1 VEGETARIANISM AS A TEST CASE 
 
The idea of the impartial position gives us, Rowlands claims, a powerful imaginative 
device for thinking about the moral questions and issues surrounding our treatment of 
animals.
156
 The moral question with which this chapter is concerned is whether 
vegetarianism is morally required because of the harm meat-eating does to the animals 
involved. Both Rowlands and Zamir argue that vegetarianism is morally required for this 
reason. An important test for Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism, and, more generally, the 
approach of applying broad moral theory, will be whether it offers an all-round better 
argument for vegetarianism than Zamir’s Minimalism. This is a core issue in animal 
ethics, and so the relative performance of Rowlands’ and Zamir’s respective arguments 
for vegetarianism will go a long way to determining whether the former’s Neo-
Rawlsianism, or the latter’s Minimalism, makes for a better moral argument for animal 
liberation, and so should guide reform in our treatment of animals.  
 
However, Rowlands’ argument for vegetarianism has two somewhat separate parts to it: 
(1) the argument that painlessly killing an animal harms the animal; and (2) the argument 
that eating animals is morally wrong because of the harm meat-eating does to the animals 
involved. Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism has the same two parts to it, but they are 
less separable in his argument. The whole of Zamir’s argument is guided by his 
minimalist framework, but Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsian framework cannot tell him whether 
painlessly killing an animal harms the animal, and so his argument for this claim is not 
Neo-Rawlsian. This should be unsurprising, since the question of whether painlessly 
killing an animal harms the animal is not a purely moral question about whether a 
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practice is morally wrong, and Neo-Rawlsianism, like other broad moral theories, can 
only answer purely moral questions about whether particular practices are morally wrong. 
 
So Neo-Rawlsianism cannot be judged on the basis of the strength or weakness of 
Rowlands’ argument that painlessly killing an animal harms the animal. But the question 
of whether painlessly killing an animal harms the animal is of central importance in the 
vegetarianism debate, and is important to consider in explaining Zamir’s Minimalism. It 
is altogether a question that it would be unfortunate to avoid, and so it will not be 
avoided. But it is to be kept in mind that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is only half of his 
argument for vegetarianism, and so his Neo-Rawlsianism and his argument for 
vegetarianism should be judged separately.  
 
Another preliminary point to be noted is that vegetarianism in this thesis refers to the 
view that it is morally wrong to eat meat derived from the killing of live healthy animals. 
Virtually all of the meat we eat is derived in this way. The meat of animals that have died 
natural deaths, or been killed for reasons other than eating, is not generally considered to 
be good for human consumption, so this is a minor point. But some moral arguments do 
seem to object to meat-eating as an act independent of the preceding acts of farming and 
killing the animals involved.
157
 It is unlikely that either Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism or 
Zamir’s Minimalism would object to a world in which only the meat of animals that have 
died natural deaths, or been killed for reasons other than eating, is consumed. But such a 
world is so different to the real one, that the matter is unworthy of attention here.  
 
It is also to be noted that the sort of vegetarianism referred to in this thesis, is what is 
normally referred to as ‘moral vegetarianism’. There are environmental, nutritional, 
social justice and spiritual reasons that are advanced for vegetarianism that may have a 
moral element to them. What is normally referred to as ‘moral vegetarianism’ is the claim 
that we are morally required to be vegetarian because of the harm meat-eating does to the 
animals involved. If you added the other reasons for being vegetarian, you might have a 
very compelling case for vegetarianism, but this thesis focuses on whether the harm 
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meat-eating does to the animals involved is reason enough in itself for vegetarianism to 
be morally required. 
 
3.2 THE HARM OF DEATH TO ANIMALS 
 
Although the harm meat-eating causes animals is by no means limited to the necessary 
act of killing them first, and although the manner in which they are killed is rarely totally 
painless, it would clearly be very helpful to Rowlands’ argument for vegetarianism if he 
could show that even a painless death harms an animal. This is because it is frequently 
contended that animals killed for their meat are killed painlessly, and that a painless death 
does not harm an animal. If those contentions were true (and the manner of raising 
animals for their meat up to the point they are killed raised no moral grounds for 
objecting to meat-eating), then there would clearly be no basis to any claim that 
vegetarianism is required because of the harm meat-eating does to the animals involved.  
 
If the claim that a painless death does not harm an animal is Scylla for liberationists, then 
the claim that human and animal lives are of equal value is Charybdis. It may seem 
surprising that the latter claim is problematic for liberationists, but the problem arises out 
of so-called ‘lifeboat scenarios’. These are thought experiments in which one must 
choose between saving the life of an animal and saving the life of a human, such as if one 
were on a lifeboat and had to throw overboard (and so drown) either an animal or a 
human in order to prevent the lifeboat sinking and everyone onboard drowning. Critics of 
liberationism contend that: (1) we all know that it is the animal that ought (morally) to be 
thrown overboard; (2) a liberationist will have to say that it is equally legitimate to save 
the animal as it is to save the human; and, therefore, (3) liberationism is absurd or 
fundamentally misguided. Rowlands endeavours to show that (2) (and therefore (3) also) 
is not true, and yet an animal is still harmed by a painless death (albeit not as much as a 
human is), and so a human life can be acknowledged as more valuable than an animal life 
without giving up the belief that humans and animals are entitled to equal consideration.  
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There is, however, yet another claim that Rowlands wants to avoid, in addition to the 
claims that a painless death does not harm an animal, and that human and animal lives are 
of equal value. The third claim Rowlands want to avoid is one Tom Regan endorses that 
says that: ‘in any given lifeboat scenario, it is morally correct to save the life of one 
human over any number of animals’.158  Acting in accord with this third claim would 
entail that if you had to choose between saving one human and saving, say, one million 
animals, you should choose to save the human. Rowlands claims that this goes much too 
far.
159
  
 
Rowlands, then, wants an argument that shows that a painless death is a harm to an 
animal; that a human life is more valuable than an animal life; and that preserving human 
life does not trump preserving animal life (i.e. the imperative to preserve animal life may 
outweigh the imperative to preserve human life in some circumstances). Rowlands does 
offer an argument he purports shows these three things in his book, Animal Like Us.
160
 As 
has been noted, this argument is not part of his Neo-Rawlsianism; it is an important part 
of his argument for vegetarianism, but it is distinct from the Neo-Rawlsian part of that 
argument. In light of that, it seems there is no obligation to outline Rowlands’ argument 
here. It would be enough to note that Rowlands needs such an argument to complete his 
argument for vegetarianism, since this thesis only set out to assess Rowlands’ Neo-
Rawlsianism. However, the opportunity will be taken to venture some original (though 
brief, and thus incomplete) thoughts on how the argument might be made. Ideally, 
Rowlands’ argument would also be assessed, but there simply is not space. 
 
It is important to appreciate that the problem of specifying what harm there is in dying is 
a problem whether we are talking about humans dying or animals dying. It is, moreover, 
a complicated philosophical problem that cannot be given full consideration in this thesis. 
What follows is merely a brief foray into the issue, since it would be unfortunate to avoid 
it completely. Consideration of this problem traces back at least to Epicurus’ argument 
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that death cannot harm us because, while we are alive, death has not yet happened, and 
after we are dead, we are no longer around to be harmed.
161
 
 
The most notable response to the Epicurean argument is that provided by Thomas 
Nagel.
162
 Nagel seeks to defend our strong intuition that death does indeed harm us. 
According to Nagel, the Epicurean argument fails because it overlooks the point that life 
is intrinsically good, and so death, in depriving us of our future life, harms us. This kind 
of harm is sometimes referred to as ‘deprivation harm’. Deprivation harm is an unusual 
kind of harm because it does not always appear to involve any negative experience.  
 
Epicurus, it seems, was of the view that an event is only harmful to us if it causes us 
some negative experience. Stubbing my toe, for example, is harmful to me if it causes me 
pain or disability, but it is not harmful if I stub it so lightly it merely relieves me of an 
itch that happened to be present in my toe. Nagel, on the other hand, contends that we can 
be harmed by something that causes us no negative experience. Nagel alleges that we are 
harmed if we are ridiculed or betrayed by a friend behind our back, even if we never 
discover the ridicule or betrayal, and never suffer any ill effect resulting from the ridicule 
or betrayal. It is suggested, however, that, though we can be harmed without being aware 
of it, we cannot be harmed by something that does not cause us any negative experience.  
 
It is suggested that Nagel is simply wrong in alleging that we can be harmed by 
something that never has any ill effect on us. Our intuition that our friend harms us in 
ridiculing or betraying us behind our back is based on our assumption that the ridicule or 
betrayal will naturally harm us by depriving us of some benefit, such as the respect of 
others. If the ridicule or betrayal does not deprive us of any benefit, and does not cause us 
hurt feelings by being discovered, then it may still be wrong, but it would be a contortion 
of language to call it a harm. If a friend ridicules me behind my back, and this does have 
some ill effect on me, such as depriving me of the respect of a colleague, I may not be 
aware that I have been harmed, since I might never discover the ridicule, and my 
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colleague might not subject me to active disrespect, but I will experience the harm done 
me, because I will not enjoy my colleague’s respect and the benefits flowing from that 
respect. My experience of the harm my friend has done me is my experience of my life as 
it is minus the respect of my colleague. This is a negative experience because it is less 
positive that it would have been if my friend had not ridiculed me behind my back.  
 
In the case of the deprivation harm of death, we appear to have no experience whatsoever 
of being deprived of our future life, because we are dead, and so are incapable of 
experience. If we know we are dying before we die, we may have the negative experience 
of distress associated with knowing we are about to be deprived of our future life, but this 
distress is a harm distinct from the harm of being deprived of our future life. If, unknown 
to you, you are the sole beneficiary of your millionaire uncle’s will, and I commit some 
fraud that makes me the sole beneficiary, it seems fairly clear that I have harmed you. It 
seems that I have harmed you in spite of the fact that you will never experience the 
distress that would come from knowing I have cheated you out of all that money. The 
negative experience that constitutes the harm I have done you consists in the difference in 
value between your future experiences after my fraud, and the future experiences you 
would have had if I had not committed the fraud.  
 
Of course, in the example given, you keep on living after my fraud, so there is some 
sense to be made of the idea that I have caused you a negative experience by presumably 
making your future experiences less positive than they would have been if I had not 
committed the fraud. But if I had simply killed you, rather than committed the fraud 
against you, you would not be around to have the negative experience of having future 
experiences less positive than they would have been. You will have no future 
experiences, because you will be dead. But if it makes sense to say that an experience is 
negative because it is less (in a qualitative sense) positive than it would have been, it 
seems that should make sense to say that it is a negative experience to have less (in a 
quantitative sense) positive experiences than one would have had.  
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After my fraud, you may have a happy life; not as happy presumably as it would have 
been if I did not commit my fraud, but still happy. I have harmed you by making your life 
less happy than it presumably would have been if I had not committed my fraud. Of 
course, the presumption contained in that statement may be wrong, and you may have a 
happier life because of my fraud. It seems unavoidable that at the point in time I commit 
my fraud (or kill you), the deprivation harm I do you at that time is, by its nature, what 
we might call ‘possible harm’, i.e. harm that will possibly be experienced, and 
experienced as less valuable (or simply quantitatively less) future positive experiences, 
but will not certainly be experienced.  
 
Rowlands contends that possible harm is not in fact a form of harm, because it is not 
actual harm—in the case of possible harm, no real harm has yet been experienced.163 But 
it seems that this claim can be countered by pointing out that, if I possess a lottery ticket 
for a million-dollar prize, I do not, obviously, actually have a million dollars yet (and so 
would not be deprived of a million dollars if I were deprived of my ticket), but I do 
actually have a chance of having a million dollars (and I would be deprived of that 
chance if I were deprived of my ticket). Though intangible, chances, possibilities, 
potentialities and probabilities are things we seem to actually possess. My chances of 
dying in a car accident are higher if I do not wear a seat belt. If my lower chance of dying 
in a car accident when wearing a seat belt were not something I actually posses in some 
sense, why would I bother wearing a seat belt? I only wear a seat belt because it secures 
me a lower chance of dying in a car accident.  
 
So if the idea of deprivation harm as possible harm is objected to, it may be better to 
think of deprivation harm as actual harm to our possibilities. If you have a one in two 
chance of being happier after inheriting a million dollars from your uncle, then I have 
deprived you of that one in two chance of being happier by defrauding you of your 
inheritance. Possibilities are real things that we possess. In some instances we will not be 
aware that our possibilities have been harmed, as when I defraud you of your inheritance, 
but the harm I have done to your possibilities enters your experience as the difference in 
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value between the future experiences you will have, and those you would have had if I 
had not defrauded you.  
 
But the problem still remains of how you can have the negative experience of having 
‘simply less’ future experiences, if this has been the result of me killing you, meaning 
you are not around to have this negative experience. Several answers to this problem 
have been suggested in the literature. But there is not space to explore them here, and so 
all that will be offered here is a couple of suggestions.
164
 The first being that you possess 
a great range of chances of various positive future experiences at the moment before I kill 
you, and, in the moment I set about killing you, you move from a state of experiential 
being in which you have many chances to a state in which you have none (this latter state 
being massively less valuable than it would have been if I had not set about killing you). 
It must be admitted that this proposal sounds less than convincing.  
 
Another way of approaching the matter is to suggest that the negative experiential aspect 
of dying occurs not just immediately prior to death, but occurs retrospectively back 
across the whole of one’s preceding life. That is, having a shorter life is less positive 
experientially than a longer life, and so one’s life as a whole becomes a less positive 
experience by being cut short. The suggestion is that the value of our life is to be looked 
at holistically, so that the end of our lives, and the deprivation of future life that entails, is 
actually part of the whole of our life up to the point where it ends. This suggestion seems 
more convincing, but it would be too tangential to dedicate further space to arguing the 
point in this thesis. It is more relevant to move on to consider the differences between 
humans and animals in terms of the harm of death, that would see both harmed by death, 
but humans harmed more by death than animals, but not so much more that a human life 
is always more valuable than an animal life, or more valuable than any number of animal 
lives. 
 
Both humans and animals are capable of positive experiences, and both are harmed by 
being deprived of positive future experiences, as when they are killed. It is sometimes 
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argued that the higher pleasures humans are capable of experiencing, e.g. the pleasure of 
having a philosophical debate, are more valuable than the more basic pleasures that 
animals are restricted to, e.g. the pleasure of satisfying hunger. It could be suggested that 
human lives are more valuable than animal lives because, in dying, humans are deprived 
of more (in a qualitative sense) valuable positive future experiences than animals are. If it 
is correct to talk about the harm of dying as being deprived of a range of chances of 
various positive experiences, then certainly it is true that humans have a greater range of 
such chances. And talking about the harm of dying in this way would make it clear that a 
person with a longer and more promising life ahead of them, loses more in dying than 
someone with a shorter and less promising life ahead of them.  
 
The most obvious difference between the value of human and animal lives though relates 
to the fact that humans do a lot more than animals in the present for the sake of their 
future, or they, at least, have a much stronger sense that much of what they do in the 
present is for the sake of their future. Humans have a constant sense of investing in their 
future by electing to do things in the present that bring them less pleasure than if they 
were to act without regard for their future. Humans also invest in their future constantly 
simply by thinking about their future. There is a clear sense in which if these investments 
humans make in their future cannot mature because they die first, then what has been 
invested has been wasted, and this must be acknowledged as a harm. It is easy to locate 
when the harm occurred: it occurred at the time of investment. If we had been living for 
today, rather than investing for tomorrow, our experience at the time in question would 
have been more positive. If that sacrifice does not bring reward in our future, then we 
have harmed ourselves in making an unrewarding sacrifice. Death not only harms us in 
depriving us of our future life, it also harms us in undermining all that we have done for 
the purpose of bringing something about in our future life.  
 
The claims that humans invest more than animals in their future; that humans possess a 
greater range of chances of various positive future experiences than animals; and that 
humans, in dying, are perhaps deprived of more (in a qualitative sense) valuable positive 
future experiences than animals are; indicate that human life is more valuable than animal 
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life. But animals do have positive experiences, and so have a range of chances of various 
positive future experiences that they deprived of by death, and so they are harmed by 
death.  
 
The remaining matter to address in this section is to show that in some circumstances an 
animal life, or many animal lives, will be more valuable than a human life. This is in 
order to avoid Regan’s conclusion that we should sacrifice the lives of any number of 
animals—whether it be a million, or a billion—to save just one human life.165  This 
conclusion of Regan’s is avoided here because under the argument put forward in this 
section, the differences between the harm death does a human and harm death does an 
animal are merely differences in the degree of harm. So, while human life and animal life 
may be assigned different weights, they are weighed on the same set of scales, and so the 
preservation of human life does not trump the preservation of animal life. The life of a 
human who is very old, and so possesses few chances of future positive experiences, and 
whose past investments in their future have either already matured or are no longer able 
to mature, could quite easily be seen as less valuable, under the argument put forward in 
this section, than the life of an animal who is very young, and so possesses many chances 
of future positive experiences (even if they are less varied and valuable in themselves). 
Or, at any rate, the lives of several such very young animals may be more valuable than 
the life of the one very old human. This weighing may not be easy, but it does seem 
possible to do. But the important point to come away with is that animals are harmed by 
being killed, even if it is done painlessly.   
 
3.3 ROWLANDS ON EATING ANIMALS 
 
Moral vegetarians claim that meat-eating harms the animals involved, and so meat-eaters 
exploit the difficulty in proving that painlessly killing an animal harms the animal to 
contend that moral vegetarianism is mistaken. Meat-eaters contend that, as long as the 
animals are killed painlessly (and meat-eaters contend the animals are), meat-eating does 
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not harm the animals involved. Rowlands has three lines of response to this contention.
166
 
The first is to argue that painlessly killing an animal does harm the animal, and to further 
argue that to painlessly killing animals for their meat is morally wrong. The second is to 
argue that, even if the animals were killed painlessly and a painless death did not harm an 
animal, the manner in which animals are raised for meat-eating harms the animals 
involved, and is morally wrong. Rowlands’ third line of response is that, even if a 
painless death did not harm an animal, the manner in which animals are killed for meat-
eating is painful (and thus harmful), and is morally wrong.  
 
Rowlands’ second and third lines of response involve him in retelling the horrors of 
factory farming. It is some of the most important work there is to be done in the field of 
animal ethics, simply being clear on the reality of what treatment of animals precedes the 
meat products we find on the supermarket shelves. These facts, in themselves, often 
provide as powerful a case for vegetarianism as any philosophical argument. But the 
purpose of this thesis is to consider philosophical argument, so the horror stories of 
factory farming will not be retold here.  
  
3.3.1 Applying Neo-Rawlsianism to Meat-Eating 
 
‘Working out what is morally right and wrong’, Rowlands says, ‘amounts to choosing 
how you would like the world to be, but choosing this from the perspective of the 
impartial position. ‘In doing this’, he says, ‘you follow the golden rule: if it is irrational 
to choose a situation, institution, or course of action in the impartial position, then it is 
immoral to choose this situation, institution, or course of action in the real world’.167 
Thus Rowlands assesses whether meat-eating is morally permissible by asking the 
question: ‘would it be rational, from the perspective of the impartial position, to choose a 
world where humans use animals for food?’ He also formulates the question thus: ‘In the 
impartial position, not knowing if you are going to be human or an animal eaten by 
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humans, would you opt for a world like the present one?’168 And his short answer to these 
questions is that, if you did opt for a world like the present one, then far from being 
rational, you would be a raving lunatic.
169
 
 
The strength of this claim is due to the horrors of factory farming and certain slaughter 
methods that still exist. Rowlands claims that factory farming is the norm; it is, he says, 
the rule rather than the exception.
170
 He also claims that slaughtering an animal under 
humane slaughter protocols is still painful for the animal, that it is not infrequently 
performed incompetently so that it is even more painful, and that a significant proportion 
of meat comes, anyway, from animals killed under a ritual slaughter exemption to these 
protocols.  
 
Factory farming is the norm because it is the most cost-effective and profitable method of 
producing meat. If factory farming methods were illegal and slaughtering methods had to 
be as painless as possible, meat would be more expensive. It may even be so expensive 
that the average person could not afford to eat meat. Applying Neo-Rawlsianism, in 
assessing whether factory farming methods and current slaughtering methods are morally 
right or wrong, you must ask yourself whether it would be rational for you, when in the 
impartial position, to permit these methods in the real world. In the impartial position you 
do not know whether you are, in the real world, a human who will enjoy the pleasures of 
eating the cheap meat produced by these methods, or an animal who will suffer the horror 
of being raised and killed under these methods. You must weigh the gravity and the 
likelihood of the harm that would result from not permitting these methods, i.e. losing (as 
a human) the pleasures of eating cheap meat, against the gravity and the likelihood of the 
harm that would result from permitting these practices, i.e. suffering (as an animal raised 
for its meat) the horrors these methods inflict on animals.  
 
It is not a difficult equation. Since one human will typically eat many animals in the 
course of their lifetime, there is a high likelihood that you will turn out to be an animal 
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raised for your meat in the real world. And losing the pleasures of eating cheap meat 
would be substantially offset for humans in a world without factory farming and current 
slaughtering methods by the pleasures (even if lesser) of a vegetarian diet. The slightly 
greater pleasures afforded humans living in a world with cheap meat barely register on 
the scales when weighed against the high likelihood you will turn out to be an animal in 
that world that must endure the horrors of factory farming. In the impartial position, the 
rational choice is clear, Rowlands says.
171
 It would be irrational to choose a world that 
contained factory farming and current slaughtering methods. Therefore, in the real world, 
such methods are immoral. 
 
Rowlands not only objects to factory farming and current slaughtering practices, he 
further claims that in the impartial position you would elect to make meat-eating 
impermissible in the real world, regardless of how the animals involved are raised and 
killed. This follows from the fact that, in considering meat-eating in the impartial 
position, you are weighing losing, as a human, some culinary pleasure against losing, as 
an animal raised for its meat, your life. Even though animal lives are less valuable than 
human lives, Rowlands still seems right to suggest it is obvious that losing your life as an 
animal is much more grave a loss, than losing some culinary pleasure as a human. That 
being so, it is wrong, according to Neo-Rawlsianism, to kill animals for their meat, 
regardless of the manner in which they are raised and killed.  
 
Of course a different conclusion is reached if we are considering people who must eat 
meat for their survival. It is quite possible that many Inuit people live in climates that 
require them to eat meat for their survival, and it may be very impractical for them to 
relocate.
172
 Since human lives are more valuable than animal lives, it is, of course, 
morally permissible, according to Neo-Rawlsianism, for these people to eat meat. 
However, it is to be remembered that the relative value of human and animal lives is to be 
weighed on the same set of scales, so there is a limit to how many animals can be killed 
for their meat in order to allow a human to survive. It is not inconceivable that the lives 
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of 5000 animals might be more valuable than the life of one Inuit human, so if 5000 
animals needed to be killed to feed one Inuit human over their lifetime, it would seem 
that it would be rational in the impartial position to determine that Inuit people living in 
climates that require them to eat meat for their survival must relocate, however difficult 
(or impossible) that may be to achieve. And if this is determined to be a rational 
requirement in the impartial position, then it becomes a moral requirement in the real 
world. Of course, this sort of assessment would be very difficult to make, and Rowlands 
is guilty of passing over such difficulties. It is difficult to conceive how we could ever 
determine the relative value of humans and animals. This is a not insignificant problem 
for Neo-Rawlsianism at the practical level.  
 
There is another practical problem inherent to Neo-Rawlsianism: it may be wondered 
whether one, in the impartial position, would elect a world in which animals may not be 
killed for their meat, since this would mean that far fewer animals would be farmed, and 
one would presume the animals no longer farmed may be released to the wild where their 
deaths will be at least as painful as current slaughtering methods. There is a general 
difficulty with Neo-Rawlsianism in ascertaining the exact nature of the alternative worlds 
one is choosing between in the impartial position. However, Rowlands addresses this 
difficulty. If we did not kill animals for their meat, we might wonder what will happen to 
all the animals that we are currently raising for their meat. It will be uneconomic to 
continue to raise them, but, if they are left untended, they will die slow and/or unpleasant 
deaths. Rowlands’ answer to this seems to be that we should care for the animals 
currently alive that were being raised for their meat until they die naturally, and we 
should ensure that they only reproduce in numbers we can care for in a world in which 
meat-eating is morally impermissible.
173
 This would mean a massive reduction in the 
numbers of these animals, but animals are not harmed by a reduction in their numbers (so 
long as they can still socialise), and so there can be no objection to this reduction in 
numbers.   
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Chapter 4 
A Social Contract with Pests and Wild Animals 
 
 
4.1 TWO HARD CASES FOR NEO-RAWLSIANISM 
 
There are two issues that might be called hard cases for Neo-Rawlsianism. Rowlands’ 
consideration of these two issues is brief, and a full consideration of them is beyond the 
scope of this thesis. But in the interests of moving towards a judgment of Neo-
Rawlsianism, this section outlines an application of Neo-Rawlsianism to these two hard 
cases as a reductio ad absurdum of Neo-Rawlsianism.  
 
The first hard case arises from the fact that some sentient animals are pests. Pests are 
creatures that we consider undesirable, and even intolerable, and thus we have no qualms 
about killing them. But sentient pests do not often pose a direct threat to our lives, and, 
when they pose an indirect threat to our lives, it may not be a significant threat.
174
 Thus, 
even though we may intuitively believe that it is permissible to kill pests, Neo-
Rawlsianism will have a hard time supporting depriving an animal of its life for the 
reasons we often kill pests. But pests can make our lives very difficult, so if Neo-
Rawlsianism says that killing pest animals is, in most cases, morally impermissible, then 
it is going to be impossible to the sell the position, since most, if not all, people will find 
this imposition grossly unreasonable.  
 
The other hard case for Neo-Rawlsianism relates to the possibility that, under it, we 
might find ourselves with a positive obligation to protect wild animals from the hardships 
of life in the wild. We intuitively believe that wild animals should live their lives free 
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from our interference. But the lives of wild animals are often unpleasant and cut short by 
predators, starvation, and other such hardships. And Neo-Rawlsianism will have a hard 
time supporting leaving wild animals to these hardships, when we could step in and 
alleviate them, even if it is at considerable cost. But if Neo-Rawlsianism were found to 
require that we interfere with the lives of wild animals, such that they cease to be truly 
wild, and require that we do this even if it is at considerable cost, then, again, it is going 
to be impossible to sell the position.  
 
4.2 A SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH PESTS 
 
If we should make a social contract with sentient animals, then a fortiori we should make 
a social contract with sentient pest animals. There is some debate over whether insects 
are sentient, but we will assume they are not. There are plenty of animals that more 
clearly are sentient that we regard as pests. Mice and rats invade our homes. They may 
pose some threat to our health, but they are unwelcome regardless. Our only practical 
way of dealing with them is to kill them; releasing them to the wild would either be 
equivalent to killing them, or see them simply reinvade housing. Rabbits plunder our 
fields, and so threaten the livelihoods of farmers and the prosperity of us all. The only 
practical way of dealing with them is to kill them. Possums, pigs and deer damage the 
native bush that we value so highly. The only practical way to deal with them is to kill 
them. And rats, stoats and ferrets raid the eggs of the native birds we go to great expense 
to conserve. And the only practical way to deal with them is to kill them.  
 
However, if we place ourselves in the impartial position, we must consider that we might 
be one of these pest animals in the real world, and we must ask ourselves if we would 
permit the killing of these animals knowing that we might be one. Whether we are pests 
or humans in the real world, we have what Rowlands calls a ‘vital interest’ in our life.175 
But our interests in the appeal of a pest-free home, the productivity of pest-free fields, 
and the beauty of pest-free forests, are all non-vital interests. However, our interests in 
these things may turn into vital interests if the pests start to pose a significant threat to our 
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health. But, so long as it is a question of vital versus non-vital interests, there is, 
Rowlands says, ‘no contest’.176  
 
What Rowlands means is that, in the impartial position, you would not agree that pest 
animals may be killed for the sake for non-vital human interests. So it seems that Neo-
Rawlsianism does not permit the killing of possums, deer and pigs for the sake of 
conserving native bush, and does not permit the killing of rats, stoats and ferrets if these 
animals merely steal the eggs of native birds. It further does not permit killing the mice 
and rats that invade our homes, unless perhaps they pose a significant threat to human 
health. And it does not permit killing the rabbits that plunder our fields, unless perhaps 
there is a significant threat of famine. In not permitting the killing of any of these pest 
animals, Neo-Rawlsianism would seem to lose all credibility. Moral vegetarianism is 
difficult to sell to people currently, but this might change. However, it is inconceivable 
that people will ever be sold on the idea of living in vermin-infested homes with fields 
plundered by rabbits and forests ravaged by possums, deer, pigs, rats, stoats and ferrets. 
This is a real problem for Neo-Rawlsianism. The advantage of a broad moral theory, like 
Neo-Rawlsianism, is that it is straightforward to apply to any relevant moral question. 
The disadvantage is that if any application produces a result that is intolerable, the whole 
theory is undermined.   
 
4.3 A SOCIAL CONTRACT WITH WILD ANIMALS 
 
If we should make a social contract with sentient animals, then a fortiori we should make 
a social contract with sentient wild animals. It will be clear from what has already been 
said that the social contract will not allow hunting wild animals for the thrill of it. That is 
unsurprising. A more concerning implication would be if the social contract imposed on 
us a positive obligation to protect wild animals from the hardships of life in the wild, e.g. 
predation.  
 
                                                 
176
 Rowlands (2002), p. 165. 
72 
 
The claim that we have a duty of assistance to prey animals is, Rowlands says, clearly 
intolerable.
177
 Fortunately, he continues, Neo-Rawlsianism does not entail that we have 
such a duty. In the impartial position, one of the things one does not know is whether one 
is going to be a predatory animal or a prey animal in the real world. Given that this is so, 
Rowlands claims that to opt for any moral principle which entailed that we have duties of 
assistance to prey animals would be potentially disastrous. If you turn out to be a 
predatory animal, then your choice in the impartial position has condemned you to a slow 
death through starvation. But even if you turned out to be a prey animal, it would be 
equally irrational to make this choice. One of the things you would know in the impartial 
position is that, when prey animals are not preyed upon, the number of such animals 
explodes drastically, and disease and starvation are the result. So, Rowlands argues, even 
if you turned out to be a prey animal, in choosing a world where humans routinely 
interfere with the attempts of predators to catch you, you choose a world where you are 
far more likely to succumb to disease and starvation, instead of a relatively quick end at 
the hands of a predator.
178
  
 
Rowlands’ conclusion is that it is better for you, whether you turn out to be a predatory 
animal or a prey animal, if a principle of non-interference is adopted in relation to wild 
animals. It seems a little too convenient how the facts purportedly come together to 
support this conclusion, and it is suggested that the picture is a rather more complex. It 
has been seen that Rowlands’ answer to the problem of farm animals dying on mass of 
starvation and neglect following the imposition of vegetarianism is to drastically reduce 
the number of these animals by not allowing them to reproduce. His proposal is that farm 
animals that cease to be of value as farm animals following the imposition of 
vegetarianism be reduced in number to the point where it is economic to preserve them as 
zoo and companion animals. Of course, following that logic, it seems that we would be 
morally required to eliminate a species if, following the imposition of vegetarianism, 
people were unwilling to care for members of the species and, consequently, the species 
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would slowly and painfully die out as a result of neglect.
179
 What is the result when this 
sort of logic is applied to wild animals? 
 
It is surely within the realm of possibility that we could reduce the number of predatory 
and prey animals by controlling their reproduction. We already play a fairly active role in 
controlling the reproduction of a number of predators, so it seems within our power to 
remove them from the wild without needing to let those currently alive starve to death. 
As for prey animals, we again probably have the ability to give many of these a better lot 
than they currently have. If we do not have the ability to manage their reproduction, we 
must at least have the ability to control their numbers with euthanasia, which would be 
rather less painful than death by predator. Most ambitiously, we might imagine 
dismantling the wild and replacing it with zoos, where formerly wild species live safe and 
pampered lives. Of course, we would have to satisfy ourselves that there would not be 
ecological consequences (or possible ecological consequences warranting a precautionary 
approach) that would make this prospect unattractive in the impartial position. If we were 
so satisfied, then it seems that we would opt in the impartial position to dismantle the 
wild in this way, and thus there would be a moral requirement in the real world to 
undertake this dismantling of the wild.  
 
If it is objected that replacing the wild with zoos would be uneconomic, and that formerly 
wild species would be harmed by having their freedom limited by being placed in zoos, it 
might be considered whether in the impartial position we might opt to simply eliminate 
all wild species. Rowlands claims that animals are not harmed by a reduction in their 
number. Implicit in this claim is the claim that animals that have not yet come into 
existence are not harmed if they are prevented from coming into existence. In the 
impartial position, the thought that you might be a lion in the real world does not give 
you reason to be concerned about a proposal to eliminate all lions, since, if the proposal is 
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agreed upon, you will then simply be some other sentient animal or a human in the real 
world.  
 
It is troubling that Neo-Rawlsianism has this apparent lack of concern for the 
preservation of wild species. Of course it can be argued that since humans value the 
preservation of wild species, we will have reason in the impartial position to preserve 
wild species, since we might be human in the real world. The problem with that argument 
is that it does not seem to give the negotiators in the impartial position reason to preserve 
humans and domesticated animals.  
 
Maybe it would be rational in the impartial position to agree to the elimination of humans 
and domesticated animals. In considering such a proposal in the impartial position, we 
must consider that agreeing to it would mean we would know ourselves to be wild 
animals in the real world, and they certainly do not care if there are humans and 
domesticated animals in the world. In knowing in the impartial position, by this means, 
that we will be wild animals in the real world, it is suggested that we would agree to the 
elimination of humans and domesticated animals, given the threat humans pose to wild 
animals and their habitats. Moreover, humans and domesticated animals produce 
greenhouse gases at a rate that will do significant damage to the world in the years to 
come. Add to this the off-the-cuff suggestion that wild animals in their free and wild state 
have more pleasant lives than humans with their tendency to self-destruction and despair, 
and it is suggested that it would indeed be rational in the impartial position to agree to the 
elimination of humans and domesticated animals.  
 
It is enormously complicated trying to work out how we would design the world in the 
impartial position. If Neo-Rawlsianism in fact leads, as suggested, to the conclusion that 
we are morally obliged to wipe out the human race and domesticated animals, then that 
would seem a clear reductio ad absurdum of the position. But even if that conclusion can 
be countered, it has been demonstrated that Neo-Rawlsianism involves a level of 
complication and wild speculation that is unattractive. The mere fact that Neo-
Rawlsianism must seriously consider genocide as an option would seem to indicate that 
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there is something wrong with it as a moral theory. It is an upshot of the fact that the 
reasoning employed in the impartial position is amoral. This strategy of seeking to 
substantially substitute amoral for moral reasoning always carried the risk of producing 
something monstrous; it is questionable whether it is really possible for a moral theory to 
go in that direction whilst retaining its status as a moral theory. 
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PART B  
MINIMALISM 
 
 
Just because we can make a social contract with animals, and should (in principle) allow 
them to participate in negotiating a social contract (if we make one), does not mean that 
we should reform our treatment of animals by making a social contract with them. 
Indeed, given that it has been argued that Neo-Rawlsianism succumbs to a reductio ad 
absurdum, we clearly should not make a social contract with animals if we do not need 
to. One of the assumptions adopted for the purpose of limiting the scope of this thesis 
was that Neo-Rawlsianism is superior to other broad moral theories, so we cannot look to 
another broad moral theory for an alternative to making a social contract with animals as 
a means of morally regulating our interaction with them.
180
 
 
Part B will first outline an alternative to making a social contract with animals that is not 
another broad moral theory. This has been labelled Zamir’s Minimalism, owing to the 
fact that it is the approach described by Zamir in his book Ethics and the Beast,
181
 and it 
is described in that book as a ‘theoretical minimization’ of the moral argument for animal 
liberation.
182
 Zamir’s Minimalism is founded on the simple demand that it be specified 
what it is that animals lack that validates treating them in ways it would objectionable to 
treat humans. 
 
Important aspects of Zamir’s approach are the ‘deradicalization of the theoretical 
underpinnings of liberationism’ 183  and ridding liberationism of the need to establish 
moral status for animals. The deradicalization is based on Zamir’s claim that his approach 
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to liberationism can accommodate speciesism. This promises to dissolve the conflicts that 
arise between broad moral theory approaches to animal liberation and some of our 
strongly held intuitions. But most important for the purposes of this thesis, is that Zamir 
avoids nesting his claims on behalf of animals within a broad moral theory, such as social 
contract theory, making his Minimalism a genuine alternative to the approach of applying 
broad moral theory to make the moral argument for animal liberation. Of course, since 
Part A concluded that Neo-Rawlsianism succumbs to a reductio ad absurdum, it must 
come as no surprise that Part B will conclude that Zamir’s Minimalism offers a better 
moral argument for animal liberation. However, Part B will criticize Zamir’s arguments 
in various respects and suggest a more minimal Minimalism as an even better moral 
argument for animal liberation. 
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Chapter 5  
Zamir’s Minimalism 
 
 
5.1 SPECIESIST-LIBERATIONISM 
 
Peter Singer, by way of definition, describes speciesism as ‘a prejudice or attitude of bias 
toward the interests of members of one’s own species and against those of members of 
other species’.184 Liberationists use the term speciesism pejoratively with the intent that it 
will portray the belief that humans are more important than animals as a prejudice that is 
as contemptible as racism and sexism are thought to be. However, Zamir observes that 
speciesist intuitions are widely shared. He does not offer any support for this observation, 
but it is abundantly clear from our treatment of animals that he is right. Liberationists 
usually endeavour to get us to reject our speciesist attitudes. But because we intuitively 
believe that humans are ultimately more important than animals, convincing us to reject 
speciesism involves getting us to change what we intuitively believe. And we can take a 
lot of convincing to change what we intuitively believe. 
 
Zamir saw that it would be easier to convince people of the correctness of animal 
liberation, if he did not need to convince them that humans and animals are 
fundamentally equal. Our intuitions point away from the claim that humans and animals 
are fundamentally equal, and so a broad moral theory is required to convince us of that 
claim. Zamir saw that he could minimize and simplify the argument for animal liberation 
if he could argue successfully for animal liberation without needing to reject speciesism. 
He also saw that the argument for animal liberation would be more convincing if it could 
be made without having to convince us that humans and animals are fundamentally equal. 
Thus Zamir does not reject speciesism, or ask us to, but offers instead an ‘elaboration’ of 
a position he labels ‘Speciesist-Liberationism’.185 He does not offer a defence of this 
position, since he does not show why speciesism itself is justified. Rather, he aims to 
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show that animal liberation need not involve abandoning our widely shared speciesist 
intuitions. This is what he refers to as the ‘deradicalization of the theoretical 
underpinnings of liberationism’, which will allow the argument to tap a broader 
consensus.
186
  
 
Zamir contends that ‘speciesism contradicts liberationism only under an overly strong 
and unintuitive rendering of the term’, and that ‘liberationism is continuous with virtually 
all our speciesist intuitions’.187 This section will explore that contention, since Zamir 
claims that this deradicalization allows for the theoretical minimalization that avoids the 
need to apply a broad moral theory to make the moral argument for animal liberation. 
 
It has been seen that Rowlands argues that animals are entitled to be treated with 
consideration equal to that accorded to humans. Convincing as his arguments for this 
conclusion are, such calls for equality between humans and animals are always going to 
be resisted. Of course, it was seen that Rowlands’ starting point was two principles 
etched deeply into our moral milieu, i.e. the Principle of Equal Consideration and 
Principle of Desert, and it was the mere consistent development of these which led 
rationally to the conclusion that animals should be accorded consideration equal to that 
accorded humans. But speciesism is also etched deeply into our moral milieu, and this 
explains in good part why broad moral theories that conclude that humans and animals 
are morally equal encounter such stubborn resistance. If Zamir can show that speciesists 
should be liberationists, his approach would appear to have a clear advantage over that of 
broad moral theorists, such as Rowlands, who try to overpower our speciesist intuitions 
with broad abstract moral principles.  
 
5.1.1 Zamir on Speciesism 
 
Animal liberation is merely about reforming our treatment of animals; it does not require 
that humans and animals be treated as moral equally, only that animals are treated rather 
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better than they are now. So Speciesist-Liberationism is by no means an oxymoron. Thus 
Zamir states that a ‘mere assertion of human superiority’, of the following form, ‘should 
not, on its own, bother liberationists’: 
 
Speciesism (1): Humans are more important than animals because they are human.188 
 
This is of course a highly popular position. Zamir simply ignores how the position might 
be justified and focuses on what the position entails. Liberationists, Zamir says, can 
accept Speciesism (1), but also deny that it entails any discounting of animal interests. 
Though the claim that humans are more important than animals is occasionally taken to 
be the same as the claim that human interests trump (i.e. morally outrank or override) 
animal interests, this identification, Zamir says, is mistaken.
189
 It is, he claims, sometimes 
allowable that the interests of a less important being override the interests of a more 
important being. Greater importance or value, Zamir says, ‘is only one of several 
considerations that jointly determine whose interests come first’.190 
 
Zamir illustrates this point with reference to the fact that one can agree, for example, that 
‘the value of the lives of numerous strangers living in some distant country outweighs the 
value of the life of one’s child’, and yet ‘still allow the interests of the latter to take 
priority’.191 Zamir notes that a critic will object that ideally ‘parents ought to discount the 
interests of their children if they substantially compromise the well-being of numerous 
strangers’.192 However, Zamir rejects this criticism as resting on a ‘crude utilitarianism 
that would be dismissed not only by non-utilitarians, but also by contemporary, nuanced 
utilitarian positions’.193 Both these latter groups accept that it is morally preferable that 
we save our loved ones and not act in accordance with impersonal, objective moral 
evaluations.  
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Zamir responds to his argument on behalf of his critic that this example only shows that 
the nexus between greater importance and trumping interests is ‘defeasible through the 
workings of special overpowering considerations’,194 such as familial attachment, but the 
nexus otherwise remains intact. And in the case of animals there is no special 
overpowering consideration that would cause us to forsake our inclination to favour the 
interests of ourselves as the more important or valuable beings. This leads, according to 
Zamir, to the definition of speciesism being redefined thus: 
 
Speciesism (2): Humans are more important than animals because they are humans, 
and therefore, all things being equal, their interests should be preferred.195 
 
But Zamir says that liberationists can accept Speciesism (2); they can accept the claim 
that humans are more important than animals, and accept the claim that human interests 
should be preferred to animal interests. Since Speciesism (2) ‘does not determine which 
animal interests should be disfavoured’, 196  accepting such claims still coheres with 
animal liberation; Speciesism (2) does not say that any human interest trumps any animal 
interest. The acceptance of Speciesism (2) does not, for example, as Zamir notes, entail 
that ‘particular human culinary interests justify killing animals in order to satisfy those 
interests’.197   
 
Zamir also notes the vagueness of the notions of human interests ‘trumping’, and being 
‘preferred’, to animal interests. The claim that human interests ‘trump’ animal interests 
may be categorical: ‘any human interest, regardless of importance, trumps any animal 
interest’198 (Zamir, following Brody,199 calls this ‘lexical priority’). But the claim may 
also be weaker: ‘some human interests carry more weight than some animal interests’,200 
so important animal interests should trump minor human interests (Zamir, again 
following Brody,
201
 calls this ‘discounting of interests’). 
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Zamir also wants to draw another distinction in understanding the notion of ‘trumping’. 
The claim that X’s interests trump Y’s can mean merely that I am ‘obligated to help’ X, 
or ‘promote’ X’s interests, before I assist Y (call this ‘helping trumping’). 202 This is quite 
distinct from supposing that I am entitled to hurt Y, or curtail, as Zamir puts it, any of Y’s 
interests, so as to benefit X (call this ‘hurting trumping’). My ‘commitment to assist my 
child does not extend to a vindication of me actively harming other children in order to 
advance my own’,203 i.e. helping trumping is acceptable in respect of my child, but not 
hurting trumping.  
 
A speciesist that accepts only helping trumping in respect of humans and animals can, 
Zamir points out, nonetheless be a liberationist: they will merely see themselves as 
‘obligated to assist humans, and to promote their interests, before [they] help animals’.204 
They can, moreover, accept lexical priority, since they will not believe that they are 
permitted to ‘actively suppress an animal’s interest so as to advance a human one’.205 
They will thus, Zamir concludes, be ‘a fully committed liberationist, demanding that all 
animal-related exploitative practices should immediately cease’.206 
 
Zamir notes that, in light of his argument up to this point, it would appear that the 
definition of speciesism that in fact opposes liberationism is this: 
 
Speciesism (3): It is justified to actively thwart the interests of an animal when they 
conflict with the interests of a human, and it is justified to do so because these are 
human interests.207 
 
But Speciesism (3) still ‘fails to constitute anti-liberationism because it lacks restrictions 
specifying the relative importance of the conflicting interests’.208 Zamir points out that 
‘even stout liberationists would not be troubled over minor discounting of animal 
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interests’, such as when ships cross the ocean alarming fish as they pass.209 To ‘generate 
anti-liberationism’, he says, ‘the overridden interests of the animal must be substantial 
while the human interests are marginal’.210  
 
The survival interests of a human, such as are at stake in lifeboat scenarios, are obviously 
not marginal. Lifeboat scenarios are hypothetical situations in which we must choose 
between saving human or animal lives; these imaginary scenarios are invented to 
challenge liberationists. For example, the fact that one would be prepared to save a 
human by throwing a dog overboard from a lifeboat when only one can be saved is 
supposed to imply a speciesist bias that even the liberationist is disposed to. Yet Zamir 
thinks that liberationists do not need to worry about such hypothetical cases, and can ‘bite 
the bullet’ and admit that ‘in life/death situations they would promote human survival 
even if this meant actively killing an animal’.211  But, he says, ‘they would add that 
allowing survival to be a trumping interest does not imply that other highly important 
human interests are also trumping’.212 
 
Liberationists could thus, Zamir says, accept speciesism of the following form: 
 
Speciesism (4): It is justified to actively thwart the survival interests of an animal 
when they conflict with the survival interests of a human, and it is justified to do so 
because these are human interests.213 
 
But when accepting Speciesism (4), liberationists will note that the various practices that 
they oppose that involve the exploitation of animals simply do not resemble lifeboat 
situations.
214
  
 
Zamir arrives finally at a definition of speciesism that does in fact oppose liberationism 
with the following definition: 
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Speciesism (5): Non-survival-related human interests, important as well as marginal 
ones, legitimately trump major interests of animals (in the sense that it is justified to 
actively disadvantage animals, even when such privileging significantly affects a 
large number of them). Such privileging is justified because these trumping interests 
belong to humans.215 
 
It is this form of speciesism that underwrites the exploitative practices involving animals 
that liberationists would like to see abolished, and it is only this form of speciesism, 
Zamir says, that liberationists need to oppose. ‘Speciesism in any of the previous senses’, 
he says, ‘should not trouble liberationists’.216 
 
It has already been noted that Zamir does not substantially trouble himself with the issue 
of why speciesism is justified. Indeed, it seems that he might even think that reasons for 
our speciesist biases cannot be given. He notes in connection with some of the reasons 
normally given, that these appear to be less reasons and more an effort to justify a 
strongly held intuition.
217
 Zamir does not want to enter the debate over intuitions, so he 
appeals to a ‘conservative theoretical principle’: ‘choose your battles when advocating 
reform—avoid replacing existing…intuitions…that can be harmlessly maintained’.218 
 
Indeed, Zamir actually endorses a version of speciesism of the following form that, he 
says, ‘coheres with liberationism and can also digest the most compelling speciesist 
intuitions’:219 
 
Speciesism (6): Human interests are more important than animal interests, in the 
sense that promoting even trivial human interests ought to take precedence over 
advancing animal interests. Only survival interests justify actively thwarting an 
animal’s survival interests.220 
 
While Speciesism (6) is intuitive, Zamir says, Speciesism (5) is not. Of course Rowlands 
would not endorse Speciesism (6), since it denies that human and animal interests should 
be given equal consideration. However, in terms of lifeboat scenarios, it makes little 
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difference whether one follows Zamir’s or Rowlands’ approach, since Rowlands, like 
Zamir, would save the life of a human at the expense of the life of an animal, albeit for 
different reasons. Indeed, both Zamir and Rowlands have the same liberationist agenda, 
so following either of their approaches in reforming animal-related practices would have 
very similar results.  
 
Zamir claims that his accommodation of speciesism results in a deradicalization of the 
theoretical underpinnings of liberationism that makes his Minimalism more persuasive 
than broad moral theory in tapping a broader consensus. But he openly neglects to justify 
his accommodation of speciesism, so his argument for his Minimalism as a Speciesist 
Liberationism cannot be that persuasive. His reason for neglecting to justify speciesism 
might be accepted, but for the fact that Rowlands seems to show that our apparent 
speciesism can be explained away with reference to the concept of ‘relevantly similar 
interests’.  
 
Rowlands contends that humans have a greater interest in their lives than animals do, so 
equal consideration of humans and animals may be consistent with killing 500 animals to 
save one human. Of course, it probably will not be consistent with killing 500 million 
animals to save one human, though speciesism might permit this, so Zamir’s speciesism 
and Rowlands’s application of the concept of ‘relevantly similar interests’ do not yield 
identical results, but for practical purposes they will yield very similar results in most 
cases. This would seem to deny that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is in any need of 
deradicalization. Just because some people may find the claim that humans and animals 
are entitled to equal consideration radical, does not mean that a theory underpinned by 
this claim is radical when it yields similar results to an approach that accommodates 
speciesism. 
 
However, it has been seen that Neo-Rawlsianism does yield radical results—indeed, 
intolerable results—when it comes to pest animals and wild animals. Because Neo-
Rawlsianism is systematic, it cannot pull back from the intolerable implications of 
making a social contract with pest animals and wild animals. Even though Zamir accepts 
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Speciesism (6), which includes the claim that ‘only survival interests justify actively 
thwarting an animal’s survival interests’, Zamir seems to have a way out of the radical 
implications Neo-Rawlsianism is committed to. Clearly Speciesism (6) does not imply 
the positive obligations to wild animals that trouble Neo-Rawlsianism, since it only 
prescribes the negative obligation not to kill an animal other than when it is necessary to 
ensure the survival of a human.  
 
But the main reason Speciesism (6) does not prevent us killing pest animals, or oblige us 
to protect wild animals, is that it is not exclusive of other intuitions. Zamir does not set up 
Speciesism (6) as a foundational moral principle in the way Rowlands sets up the 
Principle of Equal Consideration and the Principle of Desert. Zamir does not even justify 
Speciesism (6), so it could easily be overridden in the case of pest animals and wild 
animals by other intuitions. Most plausibly, Speciesism (6) needs revising to 
accommodate our intuitions regarding our (lack of) obligations toward pest animals and 
wild animals, since Speciesism (6) is intended to be reflective of our intuitions.  
 
The natural equilibrium of ecosystems suggests that it would be wise to adopt a principle 
of non-interference when it comes to wild animals. There is no apparent reason why this 
principle should not override Speciesism (6) in respect of wild animals,
221
 and, indeed, it 
seems it should override Speciesism (6) in the case of wild animals, since there is a 
strong intuition that wild animals should not be interfered with. Equally, it might be 
possible to argue that there must be limits to societal membership and wild animals fall 
outside these limits, and thus we have no positive obligations towards them. And when it 
comes to pest animals, Speciesism (6) might be overridden, in the case of pests that 
attack native flora and fauna, by any number of arguments from environmental ethics, 
and in the case of pests that invade our homes and plunder our fields, by the argument 
that societal membership cannot be open to pests whose interests are so opposed to ours, 
and who are so incapable of reciprocosity.
222
 Whether these arguments work is not so 
important in this context (since to consider whether they do is beyond the scope of this 
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thesis); the point being made is that Speciesism (6) may be partially overridden by these 
arguments, and so it can avoid coming into conflict with important intuitions, whereas the 
principles agreed by the persons in the impartial position cannot, it seems, be displaced 
for anything.  
 
5.2 THE MORAL STATUS OF ANIMALS 
 
‘Virtually all work in animal ethics’, Zamir observes, ‘attempts to establish or reform the 
“moral status” of animals’.223 Rowlands’ work is no exception. But Zamir argues that ‘for 
all its importance, such work introduces confusion into animal ethics’, 224  and this 
confusion has significant ramifications.  
 
5.2.1 Two-Stage Theories 
 
Animal ethicists who argue that animals possess ‘moral status’ (the possession of which 
underlies particular entitlements for them) offer what Zamir labels ‘two-stage theories’:  
 
Stage 1: establish moral status;  
Stage 2: generate moral prohibitions on animal-related conduct based on the status 
secured at stage 1.225  
 
Zamir notes that ‘moral considerability’, ‘moral entitlement’, ‘exclusion from the moral 
community’, ‘inclusion in the moral community’, ‘moral status’, and ‘moral patienthood’ 
constitute ‘interchangeable terms through which two-stage theories are articulated’.226 
What have been referred to in this thesis as ‘broad moral theories’, tend also to be (or 
perhaps, are always) two-stage theories. Utilitarianism, for example, establishes moral 
status for animals on the grounds that they have interests or preferences capable of being 
satisfied or frustrated, and it would be speciesist to discount their interests or preferences. 
After establishing moral status in this way, the theory imposes restrictions on action 
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related to animal interests or preferences. Neo-Rawlsianism, similarly, establishes moral 
status for animals on the basis of the principles and arguments outlined in Chapters One 
and Two. And after establishing moral status in this way imposes restrictions on action 
issuing from the impartial position as illustrated in Chapter Three.  
 
‘Common to all two-stage theories’, Zamir says, ‘is the premise that some actions ought 
not to be done to animals because they possess moral status’.227 Yet when one scrutinizes 
moral status, it appears, Zamir says: 
 
to mean nothing more than protection: entities possessing “some degree” of “moral 
status” are entities to which some actions should not be done….It is not the case that 
morally undesirable actions ought not to be done because the being “has” or “possesses” 
moral status. Rather, beings possessing moral status are beings to which some actions 
ought not to be done on moral grounds.
228
 
 
Moral status has been introduced into the animal ethics for two reasons, according to 
Zamir.
229
 The first relates to the fact that anti-liberationists have rejected the extension of 
moral protection to animals by ‘inversing the two-stage move’: ‘they claimed that 
animals ought not to be morally protected because they lack moral status’.230 A two-stage 
liberationist response was a natural rejoinder to such a claim. The second reason stems 
from the fact that some established uses of ‘status’ are misleading. Zamir considers 
citizenship as an example: You are entitled to enter the country you are a citizen of 
without a visa because you are a citizen. Your status as a citizen designates properties 
you have. ‘Animals’, Zamir claims, ‘appear to resemble this example. ‘They possess 
properties that are deemed morally relevant, entailing moral restrictions on conduct in 
relation to them’.231  
 
‘The mistake here’, Zamir says, ‘relates to missing a distinction between two distinct 
relations between properties and the…entitlements with which they are linked. ‘Some 
relations involve an intermediary stage of establishing status that then generates rights or 
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restrictions. ‘Other relations do not involve this mediating step’.232 You become a citizen 
by possessing a relevant property (e.g. being the offspring of another citizen); you are 
then allowed entry to your country without a visa. On the other hand, Zamir says, a 
person who is, for example, kind, elicits a certain response from people, e.g. respect, not 
because possessing kindness establishes some status, which then, in turn, induces respect. 
‘Kindness calls for respect, and explaining this need not appeal to some mediating 
“status”’ attained by exemplifying kindness.233 
 
‘The most obvious gain of replacing the vocabulary of moral status with that of moral 
restrictions is’, Zamir says, ‘that we begin from consensual premises: some animal-
related conduct is immoral’.234 It is universally recognized that some acts ought not to be 
done to animals. Of course, most people would only endorse the criminalization of 
practices involving obvious cruelty to animals. Liberationists seek to extend the breadth 
of practices that are prohibited. Such an extension can be achieved, Zamir claims, without 
resorting to the notion of moral status, and two-stage thinking should, accordingly, be 
abandoned.
235
 
 
5.2.2 One-Stage Negative Arguments 
 
Abandoning two-stage thinking involves revising two-stage arguments into one-stage 
negative arguments. Two-stage positive arguments isolate properties that animals have 
and assert them as a basis for animals possessing moral status. Two-stage negative 
arguments undermine attempts to deny animals moral status by challenging opponents of 
pro-animal reform to specify the morally relevant properties that animals lack. One-stage 
negative arguments simply demand that it be specified what it is that animals lack that 
validates treating them in ways it would be objectionable to treat humans. ‘For example’, 
Zamir says, ‘avoiding causing unnecessary suffering cannot be limited to human 
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suffering’.236 What moral justification can prevent extending the prohibition on creating 
unnecessary pain to all sentient beings? ‘Many aspects of pro-animal reform’, Zamir 
claims, ‘can be integrated into similar questions without establishing a positive case for 
moral [status]’.237 Exploitation, killing and severe limitation of movement are either ruled 
out or require extraordinary vindication when applied to humans, so ‘why’, Zamir asks, 
‘should such limitations disappear when considering animals?’238 These are one-stage 
negative arguments. 
 
‘Liberationists’, Zamir admits, ‘might worry that in this deflation of the argument in 
favour of reform, we end up with overly lean moral operators. ‘Theoretical 
minimalization is usually a virtue’, he says, but, ‘in the animal context, the remaining 
framework must be substantial, capable of mobilizing controversial moral prescriptions 
and dislodging deeply engrained practices’.239 It has been seen that Neo-Rawlsianism 
provides sufficient machinery for this purpose: if animals are equal negotiators of a social 
contract then some weighty reform is called for. Liberationists would worry, Zamir 
concedes, that when compared to such broad moral theories, one-stage negative 
arguments ‘lack theoretic force’.240 ‘The problem is not merely’, he continues, ‘that such 
arguments are eclectically assembled in the sense of being unrelated to [a broad moral 
theory], but that they carry little probative force when clashing against opposing and 
diverse anti-reform human interests’.241  In the absence of a broad moral theory, the 
problem becomes one of balancing moral restrictions against considerations that many 
regard as ‘more powerful and that tap interests that are closer to home’.242 
 
Zamir invites us to consider confinement (or, as he puts it, ‘severe limitation of 
movement’).243 Confinement of a fellow human ‘calls for a justification’, to use Zamir’s 
phrase, but we have no grounds for thinking that animals do not also experience 
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confinement as a harm. And this, applying Zamir’s Minimalism, raises the question: 
What is it that animals lack that legitimizes their routine confinement in our society? A 
defender of zoos might admit that zoos are morally dubious, but also claim that the 
pleasure they bring offsets the moral wrong done to animals. ‘Parallel formulations’, 
Zamir says, ‘exist regarding other areas of animal welfare. ‘Killing animals as part of 
scientific enquiry, diet, hunting, and the clothing industry can all appear undesirable as 
such, but as minor wrongs in comparison with the human interests that are being 
promoted’.244 Broad moral theories offer handy dismissals of such claims: if animals are 
equal negotiators of a social contract, their relevantly similar interests are accorded 
consideration equal to that accorded to those of humans.  
 
How then, Zamir asks, does a minimalist approach respond to someone saying that 
‘product safety, the advancement of science, or mere human pleasure overrides even 
intense harm done to animals?…‘It is important to acknowledge from the start’, Zamir 
says, ‘that no response we can make can appease an opponent who insists on such claims. 
‘Like other areas within ethics, basic assumptions, preferences, and sensitivities cannot 
be conclusively proved’. 245 It is impossible, for example, Zamir says, to prove that child 
molesting is wrong if the assumptions underlying this judgment are consistently ‘called 
into question’; someone who genuinely refuses to see the molested child’s potential 
suffering as offsetting the molester’s intense pleasure cannot be refuted with logically 
compelling arguments aimed at impressing on them their mistake.
246
 
 
Moral transformation in the past, Zamir suggests, such as the abolition of slavery and the 
subordination of women, has required ‘curtailing one group’s privileges and pleasures 
relative to another’. 247  This process, he says, never involved the impossible task of 
proving that a world without slaves, or a world that promotes equality among men and 
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women, is morally superior to a world with slaves, or a patriarchal world. ‘The moral 
dimensions of such processes’,248 by Zamir’s account:  
 
involved an intensifying sense of moral disharmony within a growing number of people, 
sensing that some forms of suffering or unequal treatment can no longer be justified, and 
that these call for change. Moral reform in such domains is less a matter of offering 
argument and more of creating and accommodating perception of hitherto unobserved 
suffering, or of facilitating a vivid grasp of wrongs that have been superficially 
rationalized away. Such denaturalization of time-honoured customs and institutions in 
turn leads to their modification or replacement.
 249
   
 
Liberationists, Zamir says, try to create a fairer world, one in which avoidable suffering is 
reduced or eliminated. They cannot, he continues, modify the thinking of someone who is 
entirely unmoved by these sentiments and convictions. But in this regard, he says, broad 
moral theorists, e.g. Neo-Rawlsians, are not on firmer ground than Minimalists. 
Consistent anti-liberationists can always insist that human interests are so much weightier 
and varied than animal interests that the latter are never relevantly similar to the former.  
 
Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism and Zamir’s Minimalism offer a markedly similar blend of 
positive and negative arguments. Rowlands’ arguments set out in Chapter One consisted 
substantially in him undermining attempts to deny animals moral status (i.e. they were 
negative in character). They involved challenging opponents of pro-animal reform to 
specify the morally relevant properties that animals purportedly lack that might affect 
their moral status. Zamir, likewise, challenges opponents of pro-animal reform to specify 
what it is about animals that excludes them from receiving the consideration we give 
humans.  
 
But both Rowlands and Zamir also offer positive arguments. These isolate morally 
relevant properties that animals have and assert them as a basis for animals possessing 
moral status (in Rowlands’ case), or simply for moral restrictions on what may be done to 
animals (in Zamir’s case). Both Rowlands and Zamir identify ‘the capacity to be 
subjected to negative experience’ (to use Zamir’s phrase) as the key morally relevant 
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property animals have that entitles them to moral concern. The recognition that animals 
exemplify this property is intuitive, widely shared, and manifested in the consensual 
desire to eliminate cruelty to animals. It has been seen that it is the possession of this 
property (which is essentially sentience) that Rowlands regards as the basis for being a 
moral patient, and so possessing moral status. And Zamir asserts this property as grounds 
for imposing the burden of proof on those that would that challenge the claim that the 
imperative to avoid causing unnecessary suffering should be extended to all sentient 
beings. 
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Chapter 6  
Zamir’s Argument for Vegetarianism 
 
 
6.1 A MINIMALIST APPROACH TO VEGETARIANISM 
 
‘It is usually assumed’, Zamir says, ‘that moral vegetarians are obliged to prove a number 
of difficult claims:’  
 
These include the claim that animals are not automata; that animals suffer or experience 
pain; that killing animals harms them; that killing or causing them pain matters to animals 
in a way that should make an ethical difference to us; that animals have some kind of 
moral status; that we have positive or negative obligations to animals; or, more 
ambitiously, that animals possess rights that call for these positive or negative 
obligations.
250
  
 
But Zamir contends that the assumption that moral vegetarians are obliged to prove these 
claims is mistaken, and the mistake is one of conflating ‘justifying widely shared beliefs’ 
and ‘drawing the moral consequences that are plausibly implied by such beliefs given the 
fact that they are shared’.251 
 
The belief that torturing children is immoral, for example, implies a belief in the 
existence of other minds. The justification of the latter belief has often been challenged, 
however, ‘since the belief in other minds is widely shared’, Zamir says, 252  ‘the 
implication for moral action does not require’ that the existence of other minds be proved 
as a prerequisite. Whereas implications for moral action that are predicated on beliefs that 
are not widely shared have to await justification of the beliefs that underlie them.
253
  
 
Refusing to conflate ‘beliefs held’ and ‘beliefs proved’ can, Zamir thinks, lead us to 
uncover what the genuine disagreements between moral vegetarians and their opponents 
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are. Moral vegetarians and meat-eaters will agree, he says, that there are some moral 
restrictions on our relations with animals.
254
 Anticruelty laws and animal welfare 
protocols are indicative of this shared consensus. It is widely assumed, Zamir notes, that 
animals ‘should not be tortured, or even painlessly killed for [no good reason]’.255 Five 
‘nontrivial beliefs’ are implied by this shared condemnation, according to Zamir:  
 
1. A belief in a morally relevant difference between animals and objects;  
2. A belief in animal pain;  
3. A belief in the moral relevance of animal pain;  
4. A belief that there are cases in which such pain should trump even intense 
human pleasures (e.g. sadistic pleasures); [and] 
5. A belief that killing animals, painlessly or not, is a harm done to the killed 
animal, and that some justification for doing so is required.256 
 
Zamir admits that proving these five nontrivial beliefs is important, but claims that 
participants in the vegetarianism debate commit two errors:  
 
1. They suppose that proving these is a burden that vegetarians need to carry 
alone; [and]  
2. [They suppose] that vegetarians need to carry this burden at all.257  
 
Zamir rejects the assumption by participants in the vegetarianism debate that beliefs that 
everyone shares need to be proven. ‘Challenging a defender of vegetarianism to prove 
why painlessly killing an animal harms the animal is as plausible’, he says, ‘as 
demanding a feminist to solve the other minds problem’.258 In a sense, it is reasonable to 
challenge vegetarians and feminists in these respective ways: vegetarianism implies the 
belief that painlessly killing an animal harms the animal, and feminism implies the belief 
that other minds exist. However, these challenges are not to the point, as Zamir puts it, 
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since the participants on both sides of the vegetarianism and feminism debates 
respectively share the beliefs in question anyway.
259
  
 
Issue can be taken with Zamir’s argument at this point, since it is not as clear that the 
beliefs in question are as widely shared as Zamir contends. Certainly, it is almost 
universally assumed that animals should not be tortured. Indeed, it seems plausible even 
that it is almost universally assumed that there is a morally relevant difference between 
animals and inanimate objects; that animals can experience pain; and that animal pain is 
morally relevant. But Zamir’s claim that it is widely held that there are instances in which 
animal pain should ‘trump’ (i.e. morally outrank or override) even intense human 
pleasure is misleading. There is no question that it is widely held that animal pain should 
trump sadistic pleasures. But those of us who are not sadists do not give much weight to 
sadistic pleasures. Indeed, because we condemn sadism, we give no weight to sadistic 
pleasures. So it is misleading to hold up this instance of animal pain apparently trumping 
human pleasure as an example of this.  
 
But, if we put sadism aside, it is difficult to think of an instance of animal pain that is 
widely believed to trump human pleasure, where the animal pain in question is necessary 
(in a weak sense) to create the human pleasure in question. Obviously causing cattle 
severe and grossly unnecessary pain in the process of converting them into beef would be 
met with widespread condemnation. But this is not clearly an instance of animal pain 
trumping human culinary pleasures or pecuniary desires, since these pleasures and desires 
can still be fulfilled (even if to a lesser degree) if the severe and grossly unnecessary 
character of the pain involved is reduced by changes in farming or slaughtering methods. 
The pain we routinely cause animals as part of accepted practices is almost always 
unnecessary (in a strict sense), so when Zamir says that it is widely held that there are 
instances in which such pain should trump (morally outrank or override) human 
pleasures, it is to be emphasised that this is only clearly true in respect of cases involving 
causing severe and grossly unnecessary pain. But the idea of ‘trumping’ implies some 
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sense of a restriction that is onerous, and a restriction on causing anything grossly 
unnecessary is in no sense onerous.  
 
But even more contentious is Zamir’s claim that it is widely held that painlessly killing 
an animal harms the animal. Certainly, most people live their lives exhibiting behaviour 
that suggests that they believe that needlessly killing an animal harms the animal. But if 
you ask people about the matter, many meat-eaters (and even some vegetarians) will state 
that painlessly killing an animal does not harm the animal. A response to this might be 
made along the lines that when it comes to the truth of the matter, people’s actions speak 
louder than their words, and people’s interactions with animals strongly suggest that they 
believe that needlessly killing an animal harms the animal.  
 
Meat-eaters, it might be said, adopt the belief that painlessly killing an animal does not 
harm the animal, against their better judgment, in order to make sense of, and justify, the 
fact that they, and most people around them, eat meat.
260
 And it might be said, in respect 
of vegetarians who believe that painlessly killing an animal does not harm the animal, 
that they, again, have adopted this belief, against their better judgment (or, rather, their 
intuitive judgment), and on the basis of their impression that the side of the philosophical 
debate that says that painlessly killing an animal does not harm the animal is more 
convincing.
261
 And it might be pointed out that there are plenty of other competent 
thinkers who are convinced by the side of the philosophical debate that says that 
painlessly killing an animal does harm the animal.  
 
This line of response in defence of Zamir’s contention that it is widely held that 
painlessly killing an animal harms the animal is less than compelling, and possibly loses 
what persuasive force it does have, when one considers that people’s natural strong 
aversion to needlessly killing animals could be equally well be explained by the belief 
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that it is merely vicious to needlessly kill an animal, and so needlessly killing an animal 
is to be avoided because of the harm it does to one’s character. Alternatively, their 
behaviour could be explained by the belief that the act of killing an animal will almost 
always cause the animal pain, or by the belief that they should not needlessly kill an 
animal when there is uncertainty as to whether a painless death harms an animal. And 
there are likely to be other explanations other than the belief that painlessly killing an 
animal harms the animal.  
 
It seems that Zamir altogether overlooks the fact that some vegetarians believe that 
painlessly killing an animal does not harm the animal, since he says that those who reject 
one or all of the five nontrivial beliefs mentioned above that include the belief that 
painlessly killing an animal harms the animal, will also be rejecting vegetarianism.
262
 
One can be compelled to be vegetarian, in spite of believing that painlessly killing an 
animal does not harm the animal, if one is particularly averse to the consumption of food 
produced by means that cause unnecessary pain to animals, because meat generally is 
produced by such means. 
 
Putting that little oversight aside, and coming back to how Zamir builds his argument, he 
suggests a typology of possible philosophical opponents of moral vegetarianism. Those 
who positively reject one or all of the five nontrivial beliefs mentioned above he labels 
‘anti-vegetarians’; those who accept the five nontrivial beliefs, but do not see why they 
imply vegetarianism, he labels ‘non-vegetarians’; and those that neither reject any of the 
five nontrivial beliefs, nor accept them, he labels ‘agnostic meat-eaters’.263  Agnostic 
meat-eaters await persuasion that the five nontrivial beliefs are justified, and will not 
modify their diet until such justification is produced. Zamir proceeds to evaluate these 
three types of opponent to moral vegetarianism. 
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6.2 ANTI-VEGETARIANISM 
 
Zamir contends that anti-vegetarianism militates against too much common moral 
sense.
264
 The problem with this contention is that it has been seen that people’s natural 
strong aversion to needlessly killing an animal does not necessarily imply a widely 
shared belief that painlessly killing an animal harms the animal. It has also been seen that 
it is questionable whether there is really a widely shared belief that there are instances in 
which animal pain should ‘trump’ (in any meaningful sense of the word) human 
pleasures (or at least those to which we assign value).  
 
Zamir is less than consistent in his discussion of the supposedly widely shared belief that 
painlessly killing an animal harms the animal. He treats this belief as interchangeable 
with the belief that there is an obligation to justify any killing of an animal—a belief that 
is widely shared. Of course the beliefs are not interchangeable, but Zamir has not 
indicated which belief he needs at this point in his argument for whatever conclusion he 
is coming to.  
 
Also, Zamir actually embraces the fact there are many (sometimes conflicting) reasons 
for why we believe that killing animals for no good reason is wrong. He says that he can 
afford to be eclectic, since one of his goals is to show that vegetarianism need not be an 
outcropping from a broader theory.
265
 However, Zamir does not discuss the possibility 
that many of us are averse to needlessly killing an animal because of the harm it does to 
our own character (and the potential harm a person of such compromised character poses 
to society). All the reasons he mentions for why we may believe that it is wrong to kill an 
animal for no good reason come back, in one way or another, to the belief that an animal 
is harmed when it is killed. But, in Zamir’s defence, it can be claimed that we only 
believe it harms our character to needlessly kill an animal, because we believe that 
needlessly killing an animal needlessly causes the animal harm.  
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It has been suggested that many people will state that painlessly killing an animal does 
not harm the animal. In the case of meat-eaters, this is generally because, when pushed, 
they find this to be the most defensible ground to retreat to. And, indeed, it most probably 
is; the argument that it is necessary to eat meat is only perhaps true for a handful of 
indigenous peoples living in conditions that require them to eat meat for their survival. Of 
course, there are arguments that are offered by meat-eaters other than that it is necessary 
to eat meat or does not harm animals to eat them when they are killed painlessly. They 
sometimes argue, in essence, that the pleasure and convenience of meat-eating outweighs 
the harm done to the animals; that meat-eating is natural or intended by God; or that 
prohibiting meat-eating would do greater harm to the animals. But Zamir, nonetheless, 
seems to be right in suggesting that the burden of proof rests with those who claim that 
painlessly killing an animal does not harm the animal, since we do exhibit an aversion to 
needlessly killing animals in our interactions with them. And that is a difficult burden of 
proof to discharge.   
 
6.3 AGNOSTIC MEAT-EATING 
 
The agnostic meat-eater awaits persuasion that the five nontrivial beliefs mentioned 
above are justified. ‘Philosophers’, Zamir says, ‘are in the business of justification, and 
so a demand for argumentative support is never inappropriate’.266 But, Zamir continues, 
the agnostic meat-eater is ‘in effect unfairly forcing the moral vegetarian into an area that 
is an embarrassing one for all moral philosophy’.267  The move is dubious, he says, 
because it invokes general moral scepticism and dresses it up as a form of scepticism that 
is particular to animals, when in truth the move is fatal for any argument within applied 
ethics. ‘Under the guise of requiring argument in the limited context of the vegetarian 
debate, the agnostic meat-eater’, Zamir objects, ‘is demanding vegetarians to solve 
nothing less than the problem of basic beliefs in moral philosophy’.268 The agnostic meat-
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eater is exploiting what Zamir refers to as ‘the argumentative weakness and fragility of 
moral reasoning in general’.269  
 
By way of example, Zamir asks us to consider the belief that: ‘without some weighty 
justification, inflicting suffering is wrong’.270 This belief, he says, is ‘basic’ in the sense 
that it is ‘constitutive of the notion of wrong’—a failure to accept this belief would 
indicate a failure to grasp the concept of wrong (or otherwise must indicate some radical 
and unfamiliar understanding of the concept). What, Zamir asks, can one say if an 
argument in support of this belief is required?
271
  
 
Zamir suggests that the most plausible position with regard to basic beliefs is:  
 
sociological rather than argumentative: we are not argued into accepting the association 
between, say, the unjustified infliction of suffering and wrong but are socialized into it. 
We wish to avoid suffering ourselves…[and] this affects our dealings with others, 
making us aware of what they wish to avoid or what they perceive as harm.
272
  
 
Zamir suggests
273
 that the ‘argument’ for ‘why the infliction of suffering on others 
requires justification’ is ‘no more than our preference’ to live in a world in which the 
infliction of suffering on others requires justification. We have good reason for this 
preference and, thus, it is rationally preferable to live in such a world. However, Zamir 
points out that ‘an argument showing that A is rationally preferable to B should not be 
confused with an argument showing that B is wrong’, and it is the latter type of argument 
that the agnostic meat-eater is asking for.
274
 
 
Zamir claims that each of his five nontrivial beliefs mentioned above is basic. They are 
basic in the same sense, he seems to be claiming, that there is ‘something basic and non-
derived in [the] repulsion felt toward someone torturing an animal’.275 In rejection of the 
position of the agnostic meat-eater, Zamir is asserting that asking for argumentative 
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support for his five nontrivial beliefs is ‘as plausible as asking for arguments in support 
of the belief that pain is…bad’.276 
 
6.4 NON-VEGETARIANISM 
 
Non-vegetarians accept Zamir’s five nontrivial beliefs, but do not see why they imply 
that killing animals for the purpose of eating them is wrong. Thus in arguing against non-
vegetarianism, and for vegetarianism, Zamir is arguing that his five non-trivial beliefs 
(which he claims are widely shared) imply that we should be vegetarian.  
 
Zamir clarifies that his discussion relates to the morality of eating meat for culinary 
pleasure, rather than essential nutrition. ‘Broad agreement exists’, he says, ‘as to the 
ability to have a fully nutritious vegetarian diet’.277 As has been intimated previously, 
there will be some people who need to eat meat for nutrition. But the vast majority of us 
do not need to eat meat for nutrition, and only eat it for culinary pleasure (or as an easier 
way of getting certain nutrients, or simply because most of us were raised eating it and 
most people around us eat it). ‘The distinct, irreplaceable, and at times intense pleasure of 
eating animal flesh need not be denied’, Zamir says. 278  And he also points out the 
function of meat as an effectively pivotal part of certain social and semi-religious events, 
such as outdoor barbecues and Christmas (with the traditional Christmas turkey). 
 
Not all vegetarians experience their diet as a loss, but Zamir claims to have had very 
pleasurable experiences in eating and cooking meat, and thus experiences his 
vegetarianism as exacting a high price indeed.
279
 Other vegetarians experience the social 
awkwardness of vegetarianism as exacting a much higher price than the loss of culinary 
pleasure derived from meat-eating. Vegetarianism not only prevents a feeling of full 
inclusion in a social meal, it also confronts the meat-eaters present over the morality of 
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their present actions, and creates awkwardness, especially when there is a lack of 
vegetarian food, which there often is.  
 
It might even be suggested that vegetarianism causes, in some instances, and to varying 
degrees, the distress that the character, Elizabeth Costello, reports in J M Coetzee’s 
novel, Elizabeth Costello.
280
 Ms Costello’s vegetarianism seems to keep in the front of 
her mind the thought that she is living in a kind of Nazi Germany in which sentient 
beings are converted into household products. She cannot see the distinction between 
living in a society in which soap is made from the fat of animals, and a society in which 
soap is made from the fat of Jews, and so she is distressed at the thought that those 
around her, whom she loves, in fact deserve the condemnation we direct that at those 
Germans who embraced Nazism (and she sees herself as not much better). It may seem 
an overly emotional state to put oneself in, but if a meat-eating Westerner woke up 
tomorrow to find everyone in their society eating dog, cat, whale, dolphin, and 
chimpanzee, one imagines they would feel similar distress. 
 
In light of such experiences, Zamir asks whether the harm involved in killing animals 
really trumps the loss involved in being vegetarian? The conclusion that Zamir comes to 
is that ‘one cannot prove that killing animals for the pleasure involved in eating them is 
wrong’.281 The existence of gladiator-fighting in ancient Rome indicates that people once 
took great pleasure in watching fights to the death. If a defender of watching gladiator-
fighting were teleported here from ancient Rome, they would, no doubt, deny that 
watching non-deadly sports provides the same intensity of pleasure that watching deadly 
gladiatorial fights does. Zamir contends that we cannot simply demand that this ancient 
Roman give up watching gladiator-fighting.
282
 If we try to, they will simply challenge us 
to explain why the harm involved in gladiator-fighting overrides the intense pleasure they 
get from watching it. We can, he says, ‘appeal to notions like rights or the sanctity of 
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life’, but these notions make no sense in the non-egalitarian setting of ancient Rome and 
would strike the Roman as ‘dubious and forced innovations’.283  
 
‘What’, Zamir asks, ‘can one say to a defender of fights to the death? ‘What constitutes a 
good argument showing that the pleasure of watching such sports cannot outweigh the 
harm they involve?’284 In trying to answer this question, he says, we come to what he 
calls the ‘foundational issues in ethics’, namely:  
 
the probative status of evaluations; their convention-related status versus a possible trans-
convention implicit structure from which they emerge; whether persuading a radical 
dissenter is in fact a plausible test for a moral position; what constitutes proof in ethics; 
the possible justification for reforming present practices and sentiments.
285
  
 
However, as Zamir observes, historical examples of the pleasures of one class or group 
being curtailed for the sake of stopping significant harm to other classes or groups have 
not proceeded from finding an answer to the foundational problems of ethics. Rather, 
egalitarianism has advanced historically by, as Zamir puts it:  
 
tapping sentiments that sometimes need to be created, until the claims they make turn 
from idiosyncratic preaching into vivid and action-guiding prescriptions. Vegetarianism 
is in the same boat as pre-nineteenth-century feminism or early-eighteenth-century 
abolitionism: the sentiments that are capable of transforming the preferences within the 
privileged group so that the harm done will be perceived as overwhelming in relation to 
the benefits gained are non-existent or weak.
286
 
 
So, again, one ‘cannot prove that killing animals for the pleasure involved in eating them 
is wrong’.287 One can, however, Zamir says, show that ‘killing versus pleasure is the 
actual equation’. 288  And one can then, he says, point to the ‘continuity between 
vegetarianism and other social causes that we typically regard as encapsulating and 
promoting moral progress, in which overwhelming harm requires limiting pleasures’.289  
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6.5 MORAL VEGETARIANISM 
 
Moral vegetarianism is the position according to which animals should not be killed for 
food when alternative food sources are available. ‘To eat animals’, Zamir says, ‘is to 
participate in and to complete a morally wrong act’, i.e. the killing of animals for culinary 
pleasure.
290
 Participating in meat-eating will not necessarily (or likely) increase the 
number of animals that are killed for food, purely because of the scale of the industry, 
and so Zamir seeks to avoid relying on any claim that it would. He also seeks to avoid 
relying on any claim that practicing individual vegetarianism will bring about mass 
vegetarianism, or that it is a causally effective means of protesting against factory-
farming.
291
 
 
Zamir quite simply promotes non-participation in meat-eating on the basis that 
participation is endorsing a wrong practice. Meat-eating itself is not wrong in his view. 
Zamir’s formulation of vegetarianism does not disallow eating animals that have not been 
killed to be eaten.
292
 It is only eating animals that have been killed for their meat that is 
disallowed by Zamir’s vegetarianism. And this is not because eating those animals is 
wrong in itself, but, rather, because eating those animals is part of the wrong that starts 
with killing those animals. Following Jordan Curnutt’s analysis in his article, ‘A New 
Argument for Vegetarianism’, Zamir suggests that the killing and the consumption of the 
animals in question are two parts of the same wrong.
293
  
 
Zamir draws an analogy between consuming animals killed for their meat and watching 
snuff movies.
294
 Victims of snuff movies are killed so that snuff-movie-watchers can 
watch the victims die. The watching or consumption of the product is a completion of the 
initial action.
295
 The initial action, i.e. killing the victim, anticipated and was predicated 
on an unspecified individual watching a recording of the killing. By filling that 
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unspecified individual’s projected position, one makes concrete and completes, Zamir 
claims, the initial action. Snuff-movie-victims are not just killed; they are killed so that 
snuff-movie-watchers will watch them die later. Likewise, animals raised for their meat 
are not simply killed; they are killed so that meat-eaters will eat them later.  
 
Zamir claims that eating meat is ‘completing a temporally extended wrong’.296 He also, 
however, claims that, distinct from this, eating the meat of animals killed for their meat 
constitutes the wrong of ‘participating in a wrong practice’.297 Zamir tries to show that 
this is a wrong independent of the consequences of one’s participation, by drawing an 
analogy with paying for the services of child-prostitution establishments (which he 
suggests exist in some countries). Paying for such services, Zamir observes, ‘does not 
necessarily intensify the pain or harm done to the children involved…[o]ne can even 
make a difference for the better [by] tipping more generously or behaving nicer than 
other clients would’.298 Zamir is not explicit on the point, but he seems to be appealing to 
our intuition that it is wrong to pay for such services regardless of the consequences of 
our participation. 
 
But there would seem to be a gaping hole in Zamir’s argument. He has moved on to 
showing how eating animals killed for their meat is wrong, in light of the fact that killing 
animals for their meat is wrong, but he has admitted previously that ‘one cannot prove 
that killing animals for the pleasure involved in eating them is wrong’.299  One was 
expecting that at some point Zamir would return to the five widely shared nontrivial 
beliefs he mentioned and show that holding those beliefs commits one logically to 
vegetarianism, but he does not do that. Instead, he concludes that one cannot prove that 
vegetarianism is morally required. In the conclusion of his book, Zamir writes that: 
 
This book’s deflation of the case for animals aims to show that there is nothing overly 
complex or morally groundbreaking in the argument on behalf of animals. The ascription 
of rights to animals and the endorsement of utilitarianism are unnecessary. Liberationism 
follows from the simplest argument within applied ethics, one that even a child can 
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follow: tremendous suffering and large-scale killing take place. These can be avoided. 
We need to try to do so. One can argue over (some) of the details, but if the moral logic 
in this rudimentary piece of reasoning is flawed, then something is fundamentally wrong 
in our core moral beliefs.
300
 
 
This is quite a claim Zamir makes. In spite of his claim that even a child can follow his 
argument, it still seems in need of summarising. Zamir’s initial claim seems to be that we 
can retain our intuitive belief that humans are more important than animals, and that our 
interests should be preferred to the interests of animals, as long as we do not take that 
belief so far as believing that we are justified in killing an animal in order to advance 
anything less than our survival interests (though it would seem legitimate to treat killing 
pest animals as a special case). Zamir’s next claim seems to be that since we believe such 
things as that unnecessary suffering should be avoided, and that animals can suffer, we 
should avoid causing animals unnecessary suffering, in the absence of proof to the effect 
that we should not avoid this. And killing animals for their meat causes unnecessary 
suffering, so we should not eat meat (since to do so would be to complete the wrong of 
killing animals for their meat).  
 
And when it comes to the objection that the animals would not suffer in being killed for 
their meat if they were killed painlessly, Zamir seems to have two replies: (1) we all 
believe that an animal is harmed by being killed, regardless of whether it is killed 
painlessly or not; and (2) it seems a one stage negative argument is available to Zamir to 
the effect that we all believe that a human is harmed by being killed, regardless of 
whether they are killed painlessly or not, and it is not clear why an animal should be 
different from a human in this respect, so the burden of proof falls on those who would 
claim there is a difference between humans and animals in this respect. Certainly (2) is 
much more simple than the argument set out in Chapter Three for the claim that a 
painless death harms an animal. But the minimalist argument seems insufficient by itself. 
Those who deny that a painless death harms an animal seem to be successful in 
discharging what is referred to in legal circles as an ‘evidential burden’, i.e. an obligation 
to produce evidence sufficient to raise an issue.
301
 The fact that only humans have a 
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conceptual relationship to their future has the potential to form the basis for an argument 
that only humans are harmed by a painless death. And even if that argument cannot be 
proved conclusively, the minimalist argument that the persuasive burden, i.e. the burden 
of proof proper, has not been discharged may be legitimate, but it will not be convincing. 
The discharging of an evidential burden does not shift the persuasive burden in the eyes 
of the law, but it can shift the tactical burden, i.e. the tactical evaluation of who is 
winning,
302
 in a case, and cause the jury to look to the other side for a substantive 
countering argument; and it is ultimately the jury that decides the case. 
 
Zamir’s admission that ‘one cannot prove that killing animals for the pleasure involved in 
eating them is wrong’,303 would seem to be no more than required by his remarks about 
the problem of proving anything foundational in ethics. Zamir contends that, in ethics, 
basic assumptions, preferences, and sensitivities, such the assumptions underlying the 
judgment that child molesting is wrong, cannot be conclusively proved. But he also 
contends that moral reform has never proceeded from the provision of such proof, and 
proceeds, instead, from bringing the suffering caused by the status quo to public 
attention, and from arguments that undermine the justificatory basis of the status quo.  
 
Arguments that aim to undermine the justificatory basis of the status quo typically appeal 
to internal coherence within one’s moral perceptions and judgments, claiming that 
achieving such coherence entails reform. Zamir has endeavoured to offer such an 
argument for animal liberation, but his failure to show that holding the five nontrivial 
beliefs he mentions logically implies that one should be vegetarian, calls into question 
whether he has succeeded in his endeavour. That he cannot conclusively prove the five 
nontrivial beliefs is not a problem within the context of his argument, but the fact that 
holding the five nontrivial beliefs does not logically imply that one should be vegetarian 
is a problem. One might believe that there are cases in which avoiding animal suffering 
should trump even intense human pleasures, without believing that meat-eating is one of 
these cases.  
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Zamir leaves us then to fall back on the argument that killing animals for their meat 
causes the animals involved unnecessary suffering, and avoidance of unnecessary 
suffering is a principle that should be extended to animals, in the absence of proof that it 
should not be so extended. The idea of avoiding unnecessary suffering (much like the 
legal defence of necessity) invokes the thought that prospective suffering should be 
avoided unless it is necessary to avoid some greater harm. Zamir’s difficulty with relying 
on this principle is that he accepts the intuition that humans are more important than 
animals, and so he would have to give human suffering more weight than animal 
suffering in any assessment of whether animal suffering is unnecessary.  
 
Zamir claims that our intuitions do not extend to believing that marginal human interests 
override substantial animal interests. This suggests that, in spite of believing that human 
suffering has more weight than animal suffering, we would assess meat-eating as 
involving unnecessary suffering, since an animal has a substantial interest in living, and 
our culinary pleasures are presumably somewhat marginal. But most of us do eat meat, so 
either our actions are inconsistent with what we believe, or we do believe that marginal 
human interests sometimes override substantial animal interests.  
 
In the end, it would seem that Zamir’s argument comes down to what he says it comes 
down to: we should be vegetarian because we do not need to eat meat, and to eat meat is 
to participate in, and complete, a practice that causes the vast number of animals involved 
tremendous harm. He has no argument to deploy against those who suggest that human 
culinary pleasure justifies meat-eating, other than restating this argument. He cannot 
logically compel these people to change their thinking; he can only endeavour to 
persuade them by means other than strictly logical ones. It is suggested that Zamir has 
perhaps done enough to show that it is unreasonable to ask for logically compelling 
argument, but it is also suggested that he has failed to do all he can to persuade us that 
vegetarianism is morally required.  
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Chapter 7 
Final Thoughts 
 
 
7.1 ROWLANDS’ NEO-RAWLSIANISM VS ZAMIR’S MINIMALISM 
 
It was stated at the outset that this thesis will consider whether we should make a social 
contract with animals, or whether we should abandon social contract theory (and all such 
broad moral theories), and opt for a minimalist approach, in order to make the best moral 
argument for animal liberation. Having considered Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism as an 
application of social contract theory to animal ethics in Part A, and Zamir’s Minimalism 
as a minimalist approach to animal ethics in Part B, the time has come to undertake the 
weighing of the strengths and weaknesses of each approach. In this way it will be 
determined which approach offers a better moral argument for animal liberation, and so 
should be taken up by liberationists in their endeavours to advocate for animal liberation 
in social, legal and political contexts.  
 
The major strength of Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is that it is an application of social 
contract theory. The great attraction of using a social contract theory, in general, is that it 
promises to avoid the unsatisfying task of fixing the demands of morality with direct 
reference to our moral intuitions. Fixing the demands of morality thus typically provides 
little in the way of justification for the resulting principles that can be used to 
convincingly fend off conflicting intuitions and principles.  
 
Rowlands is able to construct his ‘impartial position’ with reference to two broad abstract 
moral principles that he claims are fundamental to all contemporary moral theories: the 
Principle of Equal Consideration and the Principle of Desert. And, once he has his 
impartial position in place, he can use the device to answer any moral question by 
directing us to the answer a self-interested and rational person in the impartial position 
would give. The great strength of social contact theory is that we seem to be able to 
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ascertain the answer of a person in the impartial position with relative ease, and it seems 
that, no matter how many people there are in the impartial position, they will all agree on 
the answer. A person in the impartial position does not endeavour to give a moral answer; 
they endeavour only to give a self-interested and rational answer. If we are trying to 
answer a controversial moral question, we expect that people (whether they are in the 
impartial position or not) will not agree on a moral answer (i.e. an answer based on 
considerations of right and wrong). But we expect that people will agree on a self-
interested and rational answer if they are in the same position as each other, such as the 
impartial position.  
 
We expect self-interested and rational choice to point to one answer (so long as we are in 
the same position as each other), whereas there is an expectation of reasonable 
disagreement when it comes to moral choice. This is not to say that we believe that there 
is no single correct moral answer when it comes to controversial moral questions, such as 
whether we ought to adopt a vegetarian diet. It is only to say that we do not expect to be 
able to demonstrate to those that disagree with us on these questions that they are 
unreasonable. We may believe that our moral answer is more reasonable, but we do not 
expect to demonstrate to those in disagreement that there are difficulties in their position 
such that a reasonable person could not continue to advance it. Of course, this is to speak 
in generalization, but the existence of moral controversy would seem to confirm what is 
being said, since it seems improbable that the sole cause of moral controversy is 
unreasonableness.  
 
So the main strength of Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism resides in the fact that, once the 
impartial position is in place, it can avoid the problem in making any moral argument 
posed by the existence of reasonable disagreement over controversial moral questions—
and animal liberation is certainly controversial. By contrast, every moral claim Zamir 
makes is left exposed to the winds of reasonable disagreement. The essence of a broad 
moral theory is that it is grounded in broad abstract moral principles that can be readily 
agreed with. It then builds on these foundations to arrive at concrete moral claims that are 
directly relevant to our lives. Kant, for example, grounds his moral philosophy in his 
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categorical imperative, which we can readily agree with in its abstract form. He then 
applies the categorical imperative to arrive at the concrete moral claim that we should 
never tell lies or break promises. Zamir believes that we should bypass constructing 
elaborate foundations for concrete moral claims such as the claim that we should adopt a 
vegetarian diet. He claims that constructing elaborate foundations for concrete moral 
claims in the field of animal ethics is unnecessary, and that a better moral argument for 
animal liberation is a minimalist one.  
 
One of the key reasons Zamir contends that a minimalist approach to animal ethics is a 
better one, relates to the systematic nature of broad moral theories like Rowlands’ Neo-
Rawlsianism. The truth is that the systematic nature of Neo-Rawlsianism has advantages 
and disadvantages for Neo-Rawlsianism, and the non-systematic nature of Zamir’s 
Minimalism has advantages and disadvantages for his Minimalism. The systematic nature 
of Neo-Rawlsianism resides in the fact that, once the impartial position is in place, we 
have the means to answer any moral question in a manner that is consistent and justified 
by the principles underlying the impartial position. The advantage of this is that it seems 
to be relatively straightforward to answer any moral question within the impartial 
position, and we value bringing consistency and justification to our moral reasoning. The 
disadvantage is that, because Neo-Rawlsianism is a broad moral theory, and so 
systematic, we must rigidly adhere to furthering the rational self-interest of the persons in 
the impartial position. And it has been argued that this results in a reductio ad absurdum 
of Neo-Rawlsianism, since it would seem to be in the rational self-interest of the persons 
in the impartial position to prohibit the killing (in many instances) of sentient pest 
animals, and require that sentient wild animals be protected from the hardships of life in 
the wild.  
 
It has even been suggested that it would be in the rational self-interest of the persons in 
the impartial position to decree that the human race and domesticated animals be wiped 
out. This absurdity, the enormous complexity of trying to work out how we would design 
the world in the impartial position, and the mere fact that Neo-Rawlsianism must 
seriously consider genocide as an option, would seem to put Neo-Rawlsianism out of 
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contention in our endeavour to uncover the best moral argument for animal liberation—it 
would seem to demonstrate that we should not in fact make a social contract with 
animals. To ignore the apparent intolerable implications of Neo-Rawlsianism when it 
comes to pest animals and wild animals would be nothing less than disingenuous and a 
betrayal of the theory.  
 
The non-systematic nature of Minimalism resides in the fact that it abandons the project 
of trying to justify concrete moral claims as logically deriving from a single set of broad 
abstract moral principles. The advantage of this is that it allows Minimalism to avoid the 
reductio ad absurdum that takes Neo-Rawlsianism out of contention. Because the 
principles that Minimalism relies on are basically just moral intuitions, they are quite 
capable of shuffling over to accommodate competing intuitions. So even though Zamir 
sets up as moral principles the claims that unnecessary suffering is to be avoided, and that 
only human survival interests justify actively thwarting an animal’s survival interests, 
these principles are not justified in a way that prevents them being displaced in the case 
of pest animals and wild animals if some minimally persuasive argument can be hit on 
for the claim that they should be displaced in these cases. The disadvantage of this is that 
it is all very ad hoc, and the impression is given that any number of conclusions could be 
arrived at following a minimalist approach. The impression given is that a minimalist 
approach allows one to start with the conclusion one wants to reach and then elaborate on 
our intuitions that support that conclusion. This impression is strengthened when one 
proceeds beyond Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism to his consideration of other 
animal-related practices (something there has not been space to do in this thesis) and sees 
just how eclectic and non-systematic his minimalist approach is.  
 
7.2 A MORE MINIMAL MINIMALISM 
 
Though it has been argued that Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism is subject to a reductio ad 
absurdum, which takes it out of contention, and thus hands the title of better moral 
argument for animal liberation to Zamir’s Minimalism, it has also been seen that Zamir’s 
Minimalism suffers from a number of weaknesses that make it a disappointingly weak 
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champion. To a large extent, it seems that this disappointment was inevitable. The grand 
claims of broad moral theories that they can, in effect, conclusively prove concrete moral 
claims, have apparently caused us to expect too much of moral argument. Zamir argues 
convincingly that we cannot conclusively prove concrete moral claims, such as that child 
molesting is wrong or that a world that cultivates equality among men and women is 
morally superior to a patriarchal system. But Zamir is in danger of going too far in 
claiming that moral reform is ‘less a matter of offering argument and more of creating 
and accommodating perception of hitherto unobserved suffering, or of facilitating a vivid 
grasp of wrongs that have been superficially rationalized away’.304  
 
Zamir is in danger of putting ethicists out of business, or, rather, turning them into mere 
activists, in denigrating their ability to offer logical argument for moral reform. Perhaps 
Zamir does not go quite this far, for it would be to go too far, but his claims need to be 
recalibrated. Ethicists are not unique in facing limitations on their ability to prove their 
claims. Policy-makers and lawyers equally face limitations on their ability to prove their 
claims. But (good) policy-makers and lawyers do not relegate logical argument as their 
most important tool, or shirk their responsibility to offer logical argument, and neither 
should ethicists (though obviously it is legitimate and important to employ the other 
forms of persuasion Zamir refers to). Rowlands’ attempt to systematically construct a 
logical argument for animal liberation from fundamental moral principles is admirable 
(as are his endeavours to create perception of the unobserved suffering of animals
305
), and 
Zamir’s failure to offer greater substantive argumentative support for his concrete moral 
claims is disappointing. But it would seem that animal ethics is a field in which it is hard 
to come across robust substantive logical argument,
306
 and Zamir seems justified in 
reframing the debate over animal liberation by revisiting what needs to be proved and 
who needs to prove it.  
 
Zamir’s Minimalism is founded on the simple demand that it be specified what it is that 
animals lack that validates treating them in ways it would be objectionable to treat 
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humans. Applied to the practice of meat-eating, Zamir’s argument is that killing animals 
for their meat causes the animals involved unnecessary suffering, and avoidance of 
unnecessary suffering is a principle that should be extended to animals, in the absence of 
proof that it should not be so extended. Embodied in this is the demand that it be 
specified what it is that animals lack that validates treating them as though death itself 
were not a harm to them. Laying the burden of proof upon anti-liberationists in this way, 
seems abundantly justified. The law lays the burden of proof upon the prosecution in 
accordance with the presumption of innocence, which is tied to the premise of a fair 
trial.
307
 It seems that the reason for this must be tied to the entitlement of the defendant to 
their good name and the rights and/or property that the trial threatens to deprive them of. 
Since the defendant is entitled to their good name and the rights/property in question, the 
presumption should be that they remain entitled to them, i.e. are innocent, until proven 
guilty. It would be less than desirable to complete the analogy by claiming that animals 
are entitled to certain rights. But it would seem sufficient to lay the burden of proof upon 
anti-liberationists to observe that animals suffer under exploitative practices, such as 
meat-eating, and their suffering is much greater than ours would be if we ceased these 
practices. 
 
However, liberationists will never persuade the masses of the immorality of animal 
exploitation by merely pointing out the holes in anti-liberationist arguments. Admittedly, 
this is why Zamir is correct in pointing to the importance of the task of ‘creating and 
accommodating perception of hitherto unobserved suffering’ of animals, and ‘facilitating 
a vivid grasp of wrongs’ done to animals that have been ‘superficially rationalized 
away’.308 However, if liberationists give up on logical argument as a tool of persuasion, 
they lose their integrity as ethicists. Anti-liberationists are clearly successful in 
discharging an evidential burden that informally shifts the tactical burden (unjustifiably 
perhaps) back to liberationists in the eyes of the public. Rightly or wrongly, liberationists 
are expected to defend their position. Zamir fails in this, in respect of his argument for 
vegetarianism, because his five nontrivial beliefs do not logically imply that one should 
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adopt vegetarianism. But it does not seem unreasonable to expect vegetarians to have a 
better go at showing that our basic beliefs logically imply that we should be vegetarian. It 
would seem to be the responsibility of liberationists to continue to try to achieve this, as 
Rowlands tries. 
 
It has been argued that Rowlands does not succeed in his attempt to show that our basic 
beliefs logically imply that we should be vegetarian. And with this thesis drawing to an 
end, there is no space to consider further attempts to show this.
309
 But, as a concluding 
thought, it does come to mind how to get the ball rolling. It was mentioned above that 
policy-makers face limitations on their ability to prove their claims. When policy-makers 
are considering an action that may cause harm, and there is an absence of scientific 
consensus on whether the action is harmful or not, they may be obliged to follow the 
precautionary principle, which requires that the action be avoided until it is shown not to 
be harmful. This sort of risk aversion seems only reasonable. And so, it would seem only 
reasonable that, in the absence of ethical consensus on animal exploitation, we adopt the 
precautionary principle by avoiding exploitative practices, such as meat-eating, until they 
are shown not to be wrong, given that meat-eating (and other exploitative practices) may 
constitute a serious wrong, while vegetarianism (and other means of avoiding 
exploitation) raise few (if any) moral concerns.
310
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 Clearly a discussion of what constitutes animal exploitation is warranted; not all uses of animals 
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but Zamir gives considerable space to this matter in his book, Ethics and the Beast (2007). He comes to the 
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conclusion cannot be avoided that lethal animal experimentation is exploitative, but when such 
experimentation genuinely furthers human survival interests (which liberationists argue is not that often) it 
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of Rowlands, that the numbers of animals killed is not too much greater than the number of humans saved). 
So it is not being suggested that important and necessary animal experimentation be avoided merely 
because it might be morally problematic. 
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Adopting the precautionary principle in this way would seem to be the reasonable and 
decent thing to do while we wait for animal ethicists to come closer to consensus founded 
in logical argumentation. This approach can be thought of as a more minimal Minimalism 
because, while Zamir claimed (albeit on negative grounds) that the principle of avoiding 
unnecessary suffering should be extended to animals, adopting the precautionary 
principle does not involve extending any moral principle to animals; it merely involves 
proceeding cautiously. If meat-eating is indeed wrong, then the scale on which we kill 
animals for their meat would seem to more than warrant the remark found in Isaac 
Bashevis Singer’s short story, The Letter Writer: ‘In relation to [animals], all people are 
Nazis; for the animals it is eternal Treblinka’.311 But if we are prepared to even risk this 
being true—if we are prepared to even risk being Nazis—just for the pleasure of our 
palate, then the truth is that we already are Nazis.  
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Conclusion 
 
 
This thesis undertook to consider whether we should make a social contract with animals, 
or adopt a minimalist approach, in order to make the best moral argument for animal 
liberation. A handful of limitations on the scope of the thesis were adopted in order to 
make it possible to move toward a clear and definite conclusion about the approach 
liberationists should adopt in their endeavours to advocate for animal liberation in social, 
legal and political contexts. ‘Animal liberation’ was broadly defined as covering many 
distinct views in the field of animal ethics that challenge the exclusion of animals from 
substantial moral consideration. There was only space in this thesis to discuss one 
implication of animal liberation, i.e. vegetarianism. It is hoped that this was enough to 
demonstrate the difference between how Neo-Rawlsianism and Zamir’s Minimalism 
approach animal-related practices. Though, if Zamir’s approach to other animal-related 
practices had been discussed, a better appreciation could have been gained of how 
eclectic his approach is. Another limitation adopted was that Neo-Rawlsianism was 
simply assumed to be superior to other broad moral theories in order to treat it as a 
representative of such theories. This enabled the broad moral theory and minimalist 
approaches to be contrasted, so that the advantages and disadvantages of each approach 
could be considered. And another limitation adopted was that the thesis did not claim to 
substantially test the overarching case for animal liberation. There was not space to 
properly consider arguments against animal liberation, so the focus was placed on 
uncovering the best argument for animal liberation.  
 
With the purpose and scope of the thesis set out in the introduction, Part A undertook to 
outline and discuss Rowlands’ Neo-Rawlsianism as an application of social contract 
theory to animal ethics. Rowlands’ approach to moral argument and the principles he 
claims are fundamental to all contemporary moral theories were first described. The 
varieties of social contract theory were then discussed in order to show how Rowlands 
comes to regard his Neo-Rawlsianism as a logical development of social contract theory. 
Rowlands argument for vegetarianism was then considered as a test case. It was seen that 
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this argument could be divided into two parts, with only one part being the actual 
application of Neo-Rawlsianism to meat-eating, which made for a relatively satisfying 
argument for vegetarianism (presuming the other part of the argument worked). The other 
part of the argument needed to show that a painless death harms an animal. Noting that it 
would be unfortunate to avoid this issue, but was not possible to give it the space it 
deserved, some brief original suggestions were offered as to how the argument that a 
painless death harms an animal might be made. Finally in Part A, two hard cases for Neo-
Rawlsianism were discussed; namely, the fact that making a social contract with animal 
entails making a social contract with pest animals, and the fact that making a social 
contract with animals entails making a social contract with wild animals. It was argued 
that these two hard cases prove too hard for Neo-Rawlsianism and topple Rowlands’ 
carefully constructed theory by means of reductio ad absurdum. 
 
With Neo-Rawlsianism knocked out of contention, Part B needed merely to present 
Zamir’s Minimalism as a viable alternative argument for animal liberation. It was firstly 
explained how Zamir claims to deradicalize liberationism by showing that it can 
accommodate speciesism, and argued that Zamir thus succeeds in avoiding the reductio 
ad absurdum Neo-Rawlsianism falls foul of. It was then explained how Zamir rids 
liberationism of the need to establish moral status for animals, lays the burden of proving 
their case on anti-liberationists, and dismisses the request for liberationists to 
conclusively prove their case. Zamir’s argument for vegetarianism was then considered 
as an example of the application of his approach. It was seen that he leads us down the 
garden path with his discussion of the five nontrivial beliefs, and fails to show that our 
basic beliefs logically imply that we should be vegetarian. In the end, Zamir leaves us to 
fall back on the argument that killing animals for their meat causes the animals involved 
unnecessary suffering, and avoidance of unnecessary suffering is a principle that should 
be extended to animals, in the absence of proof that it should not be so extended. 
 
The conclusion this thesis has arrived at, within the constraints of the limitations adopted, 
is that we should not make a social contract with animals, and the best moral argument 
for animal liberation is minimalist, rather than based on a broad moral theory. However, 
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various weaknesses in Zamir’s Minimalism were observed, and a more minimal 
Minimalism was suggested as a place-holder until better substantive logical argument can 
be offered and animal ethicists move closer to consensus. This more minimal 
Minimalism is simply an application of the precautionary principle. Thus it has ultimately 
been concluded that the best ethical approach to our treatment of animals at the present 
time is to acknowledge that, in the face of moral uncertainty over our exploitative 
treatment of animals, the reasonable, decent and right thing to do, is to simply refrain 
from unnecessarily participating in this exploitation by doing such things as adopting a 
vegetarian diet. The fact that we instead push ahead greedily with exploitative practices 
on a massive industrial scale and mindlessly fill our bellies with the corpses of sentient 
creatures we have butchered for the pleasure of our palate, ignoring the possible serious 
wrong we commit simply because it is not a wrong that involves harm to us, 
demonstrates extraordinary callousness and gluttony. 
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